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Abstract  
 
This paper attempts to establish a stronger linkage between neo-extractivism and social 
welfare states in contemporary Latin America using both a micro and macro perspective. By 
emphasizing the human capital aspect of the welfare state’s role in promoting equitable 
redistribution and correcting market failures, this paper attempts to evaluate the extent to which 
extractive industries contribute to human capital formation. Due to the sectors’ large influence on 
the state and weak capacity to create employment, I develop the concept of the “gilded welfare 
state,” defined by the inability of extractive industries to ensure equal opportunity and generate 
formal employment despite socioeconomic improvements. Using data from the ECLAC, World 
Bank, IMF, Varieties of Democracy, and Penn World Table databases, first differenced OLS 
models were conducted of Latin American countries to assess this claim in terms of natural 
resource rents and human capital expenditures. While neither analysis finds conclusive results, 
they do suggest that extractivism should still be considered as a key determinant when 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 In the heart of the Amazon basin of Ecuador by the Andes Mountains and below the 
equator lies the Earth’s arguably most biologically diverse spot— The Yasuní National Park. 
Declared a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and Cultural Heritage site in 1989, the Yasuní is the 
home of “approximately 600 species of birds, 170 species of mammals, 80 bats, and 150 
amphibians” along with “1,100 species of trees” (Blitz 2015). New species are even still being 
discovered today. Various indigenous groups such as the Shuar, Kichwa, and Waorani call the 
Yasuní home as they have inhabited the area and voluntarily lived in harmony with nature 
undisturbed for centuries (Blitz 2015). Yet, the Yasuní is also home to something seemingly 
more valuable than nature or tradition — oil.  
 At the U.N. General Assembly in 2007, former President Rafael Correa of Ecuador 
instigated the Yasuní-ITT Initiative to announce his and his state-owned oil company, 
PetroEcuador’s, plans for oil extraction in the Yasuní in the name of social development. 
Knowing that such a large-scale operation would endanger the unique biodiversity, destroy the 
carbon sink, and displace indigenous peoples, Correa extended a revolutionary proposal to the 
rest of the world. In exchange for $3.6 billion, or 50% of the oil reserves value, Correa and 
PetroEcuador offered to abandon the idea of oil drilling in the Yasuní (Vidal 2016). His aim was 
to “set a precedent in the fight against global warming by reducing the high cost to poor 
countries of preserving the environment” (Associated Press in Quito 2013). Unfortunately, this 
initiative fell on deaf ears throughout the world. Despite the fact that Hollywood stars such as 
Leonardo diCaprio and noted environmentalist Al Gore helped contribute to funds raised over 
six years, it was not enough to save the Yasuní as only $200 million was raised (Vidal 2016).  
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Therefore in 2013, Correa and PetroEcuador scrapped their revolutionary proposal as 
their apparent vision for a sustainable economy with renewable jobs and a respectful coexistence 
with nature was tarnished. In a nationally televised speech, Correa expressed his disappointment 
with the international community for not raising the required funds. He claimed that the world 
had failed Ecuador, blaming “the great hypocrisy” of the world’s richest nations who emit the 
most greenhouse gases but still expect nations like his to sacrifice social development in the 
name of environmental conservation. Therefore, drilling of the Yasuní commenced in 2016 
(Vidal 2016).  
Yet, oil extraction is not unique to Ecuador. Since the beginning of colonial times over 
500 years ago, the economic, social, and political landscape of Latin America has consistently 
been determined by the use of extractive industries. Extractivism, or the removal of large 
unprocessed or limitedly processed quantities of non-renewable and renewable natural resources 
from nature, propagates itself on the essence of unsustainability (Acosta 2013). Whether these 
intensive extractive activities stem from oil and mining to agro-industry, forestry, or fishing, 
such practices are detrimental to the environment and society. Local communities, indigenous 
peoples, and people excluded from the national political community bear the brunt of the social 
and economic costs of extractive industries which are rarely, if ever, considered by the extractive 
industries’ costs. This includes “global climate change, soil depletion, deforestation, loss of food 
sovereignty, declining biodiversity, contamination of freshwater” and a myriad of other 
consequences (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). Yet, these extractivist practices generate substantial 
revenue, or rent for developing states. Therefore, governments begin extracting and exporting 
even more natural resources although they are in fixed supply (Brand 2016). Hailed as the de 
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facto economic and developmental model for Latin American states, the relevance of 
extractivism in contemporary society stems from its derivation ⁠—neo-extractivism. 
 Originally termed by Uruguayan scholar Eduardo Gudynas as part of his ten theses on the 
new Latin American extractivism, neo-extractivism has been suggested to be the contemporary 
developmental and economic model of Latin American countries (Gudynas 2009). In many 
ways, neo-extractivism maintains the traditional characteristics of classical extractivism in that it 
results in environmental and social costs. Yet what truly distinguishes this new extractivism from 
the old is the stronger role the state plays in facilitating extractivism for social development. 
Such strong control over extraction was especially characteristic of Pink Tide governments, or 
the numerous progressive governments who were elected throughout Latin America since the 
late 1990s. In the post-neoliberal policies of such governments, Pink Tide governments were 
able to “regulate the appropriation of resources and their export by nationalizing companies and 
raw materials, revising contracts, and increasing export duties and taxes” (Burchardt and Dietz 
2014, 470). With this surplus revenue generated from extraction, “the exploitation of nature 
serves to secure national development and sovereignty, to reduce poverty, increase social 
participation,” “diversify local economies,” and “guarantee political stability” (Burchardt and 
Dietz 2014, 470). This in turn, provides these governments with the legitimacy to continue 
increasing extraction for the sake of improving social conditions. Indeed, there were substantial 
improvements to the formation of the welfare state that will be discussed throughout this paper.  
 Yet it is concerning that in times of commodity price fluctuations, Latin American 
welfare states seem unable to sustain themselves in the long run. Perhaps no other time best 
explains this feat than the emergence of the COVID-19 crisis. As shown in Figure 1.1, prices for 
copper, coal, and oil have been decreasing since 2014.  Former Colombian finance minister 
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Mauricio Cárdenas (2020) reports that the further fall in “global supply and demand for dry bulk 
shipping stocks such as building materials and commodities” is “already affecting Latin 
American exports.” With the additional decline in economic activity for China1 due to COVID-
19, Latin America faces lower prices for their commodities. Since Ecuador and Venezuela for 
example have great fiscal dependence on oil for example, each $10 “decline in the price 
represents a loss of fiscal revenues close to 1 percent” of their GDP (Cárdenas 2020). Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico lose 0.5 percent of their GDP for the same price decrease (Cárdenas 
2020). This loss of revenue has significant implications pertaining to the region’s ability to 
publicly finance its welfare states.  
Figure 1.1 The Fall in Commodity Prices 
 
 
1 China accounts for 50% of global demand in copper and nickel and 15% of oil consumption (Cárdenas 2020).  
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 As contemporary welfare states were already under strain, some are now “taking debt2 to 
fund social compensation programs, economic recovery packages and improvements in public 
health systems” (Monge 2020). While countries like Brazil and Costa Rica have a universal 
health-care system, many still “have large gaps in accessibility caused mainly by out-of-pocket 
health expenditure” (Romero 2020). Informal workers “have little access to social protection” 
and healthcare and must therefore, continue to work despite any “quarantine and social 
distancing measures” (Romero 2020). Such healthcare fragility is accompanied by a less than 
inclusive education system. For example, Bolivia’s Education Ministry cancelled the entire 
school year as they had “difficulties in reaching students in rural areas with little internet access” 
(Gonzalez et al. 2021). Ultimately, Henry Romero (2020) states that “an estimated 231 million 
people in Latin America are predicted to be living in poverty by the end of 2020.” This high of a 
poverty level was last seen fifteen years ago in 2006 (Romero 2020).  
 Considering the political economy of contemporary Latin America, this paper 
ultimately attempts to establish a stronger and much needed linkage between neo-extractivism 
and the Latin American welfare state.  By identifying the roles of a typical welfare state in 
promoting well-being through decentralized decision making and the correction of market 
failures, this paper uncovers two important mechanisms that extractive industries use to 
indirectly shape welfare state formation in relation to the state. The first includes its newfound 
redistributive responsibility from its influence on the state. The second includes its ability to 
generate formalized employment for the state. As neo-extractivism and the welfare state both 
contain widespread variations, providing a foundation for a potential connection between these 
 
2 For example, the Inter-American Development Bank loaned $4 billion to Argentina to curtail economic impacts 
from the pandemic (Gonzalez et al. 2021).  
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two topics is integral in establishing a clearer relationship that can be improved upon by future 
scholars. 
 Unlike other papers, this paper places a stronger emphasis on extractive industries as a 
key actor in forming the welfare state. With the global emergence of extractive industries like 
Exxon Mobil and Eni in Guyana and Angola whose welfare states are still in development, 
researchers may benefit from understanding how extractive industries operate within a state to 
promote or hinder social development.  Previous research has removed extractive industries from 
discussions concerning social development. Though there is research regarding the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), or business practice that holds extractive firms socially accountable 
for its practices, they are typically only confined to business-related rationales and justifications 
for extractivist practices rather than a genuine interest in social development. Cardno Entrix and 
Cardno Latin America, a global consulting firm for extractive industries across Latin America, 
believes that extractive firms must merely be “good neighbors” to local communities since it 
helps them “operate successfully in the long term” (Aleman 2020). Yet, extractive industries and 
firms are an imperative “middle-man” that mediate the relationship between the state and its 
people indirectly, playing a larger role than realized even when they are gone.  
 The paper is broken up into the following sections. In "Chapter II. Latin America Welfare 
States," the definition and functions of the traditional welfare are explored and adapted to 
contemporary Latin American social policy efforts. In "Chapter III. Neo-extractivism, " the role 
of extraction in contemporary Latin America is reviewed and connected to social welfare efforts 
in the region.  In "Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State," two mechanisms of neo-extractivism, 
namely its influence on the government’s redistributive power and its limited ability to create 
employment are identified in order to explain how neo-extractivism affects the formation of 
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the Latin American welfare state in the human capital investment perspective. Both "Chapters V. 
Medium-N First Differenced Model” and "Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model” 
attempt to empirically establish a direct, quantitative relationship between neo-extractivism and 
welfare state quality in terms of extractive industry reliance and human capital investment. The 
former operationalizes the primary determinants of welfare state quality and performs a first 
difference OLS regression of 33 observations to consider the impact of natural resource rents on 
human capital at the beginning and end of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government. 
Meanwhile, the latter considers other potential determinants of welfare state quality and 
performs a first differenced analysis of 18 Latin American countries followed by a discussion of 
key findings. Finally, "Chapter VII. Conclusion" discusses important implications of the findings 
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Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States 
The Traditional Welfare State 
I.          Defining the Welfare State  
The concept of a welfare state has consistently been debated and refined since its 
introduction in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Despite significant discussions on its true 
definition, characteristics, classifications, and typologies, the welfare state still remains an 
amorphous topic in and of itself in the literature. According to Britannica (2021), the welfare 
state is based on principles such as “equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and 
public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good 
life.” Therefore, it assumes more responsibility in safeguarding and advocating for the 
“economic and social well-being of its citizens” (Britannica 2021).  
Asa Briggs (1961, 228) provided the most commonly used definition of the welfare 
state.  He stated that “the welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used 
(through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least 
three directions.” The first direction includes “guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum 
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property” (Briggs 1961, 228). The 
second direction includes providing social protection for the people against large risks such as 
unemployment, old age, illnesses, or disabilities to avoid “individual and family crises” (Briggs 
1961, 228). The third direction ensures “that all citizens without distinction of status or class are 
offered the best standards available to a certain agreed range of social services” (Briggs 1961, 
228).  
While this is a more comprehensive and traditional definition of the welfare state, there 
are certain important structural components to the welfare state that must be emphasized in each 
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of them, namely its underlying capitalistic and democratic3 foundation. In order to unearth the 
welfare state’s basic premise and philosophy, it is useful to distinguish the welfare state from the 
“neo-liberal,” or market-oriented state. While both states are capitalistic and democratic in 
nature, the neo-liberal state in its purest, theoretical sense assumes that markets are Pareto 
efficient (Stiglitz 2017). This means that all resources are put to its highest valued use, economic 
growth is maximized, all gains from trade are exhausted, and market actors assumed to be acting 
in their own self-interest ensure the best outcome for society (Halbac 2020a). Therefore, neo-
liberal states require limited state intervention to guarantee macroeconomic stability.  On the 
other hand, the welfare state assumes that markets are generally not Pareto efficient. Therefore, it 
requires more state intervention to help correct the market failures in the economy and society 
that typically deprive the poor and middle classes of basic necessities.  
In addition to this economic aspect of the state, the political aspect of the state lies in the 
redistributions of income or wealth (Stiglitz 2018). Redistributions in a neo-liberal state are 
lump-sum in nature, meaning that they are given as a one-time payment (Stiglitz 2017). On the 
other hand, redistributions in a welfare state are given as a series of payments to people who the 
government deems greatly in need of them. As a decentralized decision-making entity, 
institutions at different levels of government exercise greater authority and responsibilities over 
the management and allocation of financial resources. Therefore, the state’s role becomes much 
more active in a welfare state than in a neo-liberal state as it becomes more responsible for the 
well-being at all levels.  
 
3 Democracy is not a necessary foundation for establishing an effective welfare state. Yet, this paper will rest on this 
assumption since democracies are more inclined to prioritize equal opportunity and encourage citizen participation 
through voting, protests, and other forms of contestation.  
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This foundation will be explored more fully throughout this paper as these are the central 
aspects that allow the welfare state to pursue its objectives. In the meantime for the purposes of 
simplicity, a welfare state can be defined as “a political phenomenon in which capitalist societies 
create mechanisms to assure social security to citizens in an inclusive and expansive democracy” 
(Fleury 2017, 2). Through mechanisms such as the distribution of revenues and services, anti-
poverty programs, and public provisions of basic necessities, the welfare state may be able to 
alleviate the existing deprivations in society. Though this definition does not encompass all of 
the necessary functions of the welfare state, it brilliantly captures the essence of what this paper 
will be addressing in terms of state intervention and societal well-being. 
II. Typologizing the Welfare State 
Perhaps one of the most recognized works in the welfare state literature is Danish 
sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. In his 
widely accepted book, Esping-Andersen differentiated between European welfare regimes using 
his own influential typology based on the levels of decommodification and stratification. 
Decommodification “occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Anderson 1990, 21-22). When 
a state has high decommodification, or low commodification, this means that individuals are able 
to uphold a certain acceptable standard of living without selling their labor in the labor market. 
Most Nordic countries are highly decommodified. When a state has low decommodification, or 
high commodification, individuals must sell their labor by participating in the labor market if 
they hope to uphold their standard of living. There is little to no access to services such as 
unemployment compensation, socialized medicine, or retirement benefits. The United States for 
example, is highly commodified.  
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On the other hand, stratification refers to the extent to which the state differentiates 
between which social groups receive what benefits. For example, citizens may be entitled to 
unemployment insurance but undocumented immigrants may not. Or, those who work in the 
formal sector may be entitled to contributory pension plans but workers in the informal sector 
may not. Ideally, welfare states hope to achieve low stratification in which everyone receives 
access to benefits, regardless of gender, religion, occupation, race, and other characteristics.  
With these two criteria in mind, Esping-Andersen notably distinguishes between the 
liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). Liberal 
welfare states were classified by low decommodification and low stratification, conservative 
states were classified by low decommodification and high stratification, and social-democratic 
states were classified by high decommodification and low stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Though Esping-Andersen’s typology was confined to modern European states, this core criteria 
was applied to non-European states as well.  
Latin American Welfare States 
 I.          Typologizing Latin American Welfare States 
The first person to apply Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states to the Latin 
American context was Fernando Filgueira (2005). Referring to the system of social assistance 
and services as social states instead of welfare states, Filgueira made a compelling case for his 
classification of welfare efforts in Latin America. Using the study of Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1991) 
who distinguished Latin American social security efforts into pioneer, intermediate, and 
latecomer states, Filgueira was able to complement Mesa-Lago’s work while also creating his 
own typology (Filgueira 2005, 11). Considering both human capital investment and investment 
criteria until the 1970s as the basis of his work, Filgueira found three regional patterns based on 
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“coverage, benefits, requirements, and stratification of services” (Franzoni 2008). The first 
consists of “stratified universalism” and included states such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay 
(Filgueira 2005, 13). Though states within this pattern had established and extended policies 
such as universal access to primary education and basic health services to a vast majority of their 
populations, these policies were stratified according to one’s occupation (Filgueira 2005, 
69).  The second pattern consists of “exclusionary” states such as Honduras and Nicaragua 
containing “residual states and almost nonexistent public redistribution of resources” (Franzoni 
2008, 69). The third pattern consists of “dual” states such as Brazil and Mexico which can be 
thought of as a hybrid between the first two patterns since it contains both “stratified 
universalism in urban areas and exclusion in rural ones” (Franzoni 2008, 69).   
Based on Filgueira’s findings, scholars Evelyne Huber and John Stephens (2005) 
reviewed Latin American social policies that focused on increasing both social protection and 
human capital formation (Franzoni 2008). By considering coverage, expenditure levels, and 
social investment allocation, Huber and Stephens were eventually able to group several Latin 
American states according to their fiscal effort and extent of coverage (Franzoni 2008). Chile 
showed the highest levels of fiscal effort and coverage followed by Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Costa Rica as the first cluster, Brazil and Mexico as the second cluster, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Columbia, and Venezuela as the third cluster, and Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua as the fourth cluster (Franzoni 2008). Unlike Filgueira, Huber and Stephens (2005) 
actively refer to Latin American social policy efforts as emerging welfare states.4 This suggests 
that the welfare state is in the formation of being developed, an assertion that this paper will 
adopt and build upon.  
 
4 Latin American welfare states have also been called in transition welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1996).  
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II. Does Latin America Even Have Welfare States?  
Despite its continuous efforts to improve the lives of its people, Latin America has only 
recently been included in the welfare state literature. For one, democracy has not historically 
been consolidated in the region until the end of the 20th century. In addition, several Latin 
American countries lack the strong degree of institutionalizing social programs, teeters between 
capitalism and socialism within the past and present, and have high market informality and 
income disparities. Therefore, it is understandable why scholars are hesitant to apply the concept 
of the welfare state to the Latin American context. Yet, it seems inaccurate to discount the 
significant improvements in well-being of the Latin American poor when compared to its 
previous periods in terms of welfare effort.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Latin American states have drastically improved 
their social policies and protection systems for the poor. Traditionally, the three types of social 
policy efforts in Latin America are (1) contributory social insurance, (2) social assistance, and 
(3) social services. Contributory social insurance protects against large risks such as 
unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age (McGuire 2012). Social policies that increase 
human capital include social assistance, or “general revenue-funded cash or other types of 
transfers to needy individuals, households, or communities” and the public provision of general 
revenue-funded basic social services, such as health care and education (McGuire 2012, 200).   
From 1920 to 1980, which is considered the first period of Latin American social policy, 
governments expanded social insurance to cover both white-collar and blue-collar workers in the 
formal sector (McGuire 2012). Yet, they still provided insufficient social assistance and public 
social services to those of lower socioeconomic status living in urban slums or rural areas 
(McGuire 2012). From 1980 to 1990, or the second period of Latin American social policy, 
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social insurance coverage was decreased due to a series of economic crises (McGuire 2012). 
This led to officials reevaluating the necessity of providing social assistance and services to its 
people. Yet while contributory social insurance coverage continued to fall in the third period 
from 1990 to the present, social protection and basic public social services were significantly 
expanded for the poor (McGuire 2012).  
 In this third period, the most significant innovation has been expansion of coverage to 
people in the “informal sector and to people with insufficient histories of contributions to social 
insurance schemes” (Huber and Ponce de León 2019). Unlike the previous two periods, a profuse 
majority of Latin Americans now had the right to access some type of cash assistance and to 
government provided healthcare (Huber and Ponce de León 2019). In 2013, only 28% of the 
population in Latin America lived in poverty as compared to 43% at the beginning of the century 
(Ocampo and Gómez-Arteaga 2016). Therefore, this paper will primarily focus on the 
contemporary Latin American welfare state in terms of the third period.  
III. A Move Away from the Traditional Welfare State  
 Scholars who study contributory social insurance are mainly concerned with 
understanding what these insurances entail, who the recipients of these insurances are, and how 
they are able to receive them. This paper is more concerned with the well-being of the Latin 
American poor and their equal access to services and assistance since they are the most 
vulnerable group in the welfare state. Therefore, focusing on the Latin American welfare state in 
the third period of welfare state development requires a move away from the traditional 
characteristics of the welfare state, namely its emphasis on the first main type of social policy, 
contributory social insurance that corrects for “the failure of private risk markets” (Stiglitz 2018, 
12). Contributory social insurance has a history of having a “highly regressive benefit incidence” 
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in Latin America (McGuire 2012, 200). When excluding employee and employer contributions, 
public spending on social insurance benefited the richest 20% of the population instead of the 
lowest 20% of the population “in a ratio of 4:1 in Mexico, 7:1 in Brazil, and 12:1 in Argentina” 
(McGuire 2012, 200). This suggests that the policy heavily favors the well-off and poses a large 
tax burden, yet yields little benefits to the economically disadvantaged.  
Contrary to social insurance, social assistance and social services tend to have a less 
regressive benefit incidence. Though they were insufficiently funded and were poorly designed 
and implemented in the previous two periods of Latin American welfare state development, 
social assistance and services dramatically improved from 2000 onwards. All things considered, 
almost every Latin American government operates some type of “means-tested income transfer 
program” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 988). For example, non-contributory policies such as 
pensions and conditional cash transfers were expanded to millions of traditionally excluded 
families (Holland and Schneider 2017a). Holland and Schneider (2017a, 991) refer to this Latin 
American move as the “easy stage of redistribution” in which non-contributory cash transfer 
programs (CCTs) and non-contributory pensions (NCPs) are essentially layered “on top of 
truncated welfare systems.” In Bolivia, 40.2% of households received cash transfers in 2011 
(Holland and Schneider 2017a, 993). Such an easy phase of redistribution seems to have 
improved the conditions of the Latin American poor and excluded populations. For example, the 
decrease in the poverty rate for all of Latin America between 2000 and 2010 averaged 10.2% 
while the Gini coefficient5 also fell five points as the rest of the world faced increases (Holland 
and Schneider 2017a). As indicated by the downward regional trend, Figure 2.1 shows that 
 
5 The Gini coefficient as a percentage measures income inequality with a score of 100 meaning perfect inequality 
and a score of 0 meaning perfect equality.  
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inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient has decreased for almost all Latin American 
countries.  
Figure 2.1 Income Inequality in Latin America (1998-2018) 
 
In truth, the contributory social insurance characteristic of the traditional welfare state is 
not adapted to the unique experiences of Latin American states as it has significant gaps in 
coverage for Latin America’s most vulnerable. Therefore, this paper will primarily discuss the 
welfare state in terms of the latter two non-contributory social policies, social assistance and 
social services, unless stated otherwise. 
IV. Human Capital Formation in 21st Century Latin American Welfare States 
This paper’s focus on the welfare state in the human capital investment perspective hopes 
to address this shortcoming that arises when only analyzing the welfare state in terms of 
decommodification and stratification. Similar to the work of Huber and Stephens (2005), this 
paper will use human capital investment as the defining criteria for the variation in Latin 
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American welfare states. The OECD (2001, 7) defines human capital as “the knowledge, skills, 
competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, 
social and economic well-being.” Using a cost-based approach, the United Nations suggests that 
human capital investment includes creating the ability “to educate and train individuals,” 
“provide them with better health and safety,” and “improve labour allocation via job search and 
mobility” (UNECE 2016, 25). Such dimensions of human capital investment are crucial when 
considering its role in the 21st century welfare state.  
In the 21st century welfare state, a key tenet is “ensuring equality of opportunity” which 
depends on human capital investment (Stiglitz 2018, 12).  According to Caterina Calsamiglia 
(2009, 274), “equality of opportunity requires that an individual’s success in life be independent 
of irrelevant characteristics, that is, of characteristics that the individual should not be 
responsible for.”  This may include an individual’s race, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, 
sexual orientation, and so on. Such characteristics should not hinder the individual from 
acquiring the skills needed to fully participate in the democratic and capitalistic components of 
the welfare state. There is no equality of opportunity as long as immense gaps in wealth and 
income exist between such groups. Therefore, a supplemental tenet of the 21st century welfare 
state includes “fighting against the intergenerational transmission of advantages and against 
discrimination in all of its form” in order to create a just society (Stiglitz 2018, 12). While the 
neoliberal state focuses more on the trade-off between efficiency and equity, the 21st century 
welfare state realizes its “dual role” to “advance both equity and efficiency” (Leoni 2016). 
Therefore, the 21st century welfare state is focused on including previously excluded populations 
as a means towards equality and efficiency. This suggests that increasing political and economic 
participation may mitigate inequality and poverty to some extent.  
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Employment becomes “the best prevention against social risks, which have become more 
difficult [for the state] to insure against” (Leoni 2016). This may help equalize market income 
(Huber 2015). Such an emphasis on the high long term-returns entails a strong focus on children, 
specifically through cultivating their health and education at a young age so they are able to 
participate in the labor market (Stiglitz 2018). Stiglitz (2018, 12) therefore characterizes the 21st 
century welfare state as “a system of consumer, investor, and worker protection, including a 
system trying to increase competitiveness and transparency of markets.”  
It is important to note that this paper’s focus on human capital investment does not 
advocate for an exclusive move from redistribution to predistribution as an alternative. Yet, it 
does recognize the merits of Latin American states reconfiguring how their welfare state 
addresses inequality and poverty. Critics of the human capital investment approach typically 
argue that the move towards human capital investment tends to inflate its importance, as it fails 
to address the deep structural inequalities and poverty. Though this assertion may be true, this 
paper chooses to see human capital investment as a supplement to the existing contributory 
social protection framework rather than a replacement that increases equal opportunity for 
previously excluded populations. This will be explained more fully in the following section.  
The goal of this paper is also not to argue which set of social policies are better as both 
possess noteworthy qualities, but rather to unearth key determinants of welfare state formation 
and variation. It is believed that the interaction between economic and political forces may hold 
some insight into why the Latin American welfare state must constantly reinvent itself despite its 
progress in lowering poverty and inequality.  Therefore, the next section will consider the role of 
neo-extractivism in shaping the welfare state.  
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Chapter III. Neo-extractivism 
Neo-Extractivism in a Developmentalist Context 
 I.         Neo-Extractivism 
 According to Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez (2020) neo-extractivism is “a term used to refer 
to the wave of large-scale natural resource exploitation that has been pursued by progressive 
governments throughout the region since the early 2000s.” As opposed to classical extractivism 
in which the state followed neo-liberal policies such as privatization and deregulation, Pink Tide 
governments ensured “stronger state participation in the regulation and oversight in the 
regulation and oversight of extractive projects” (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez 2020, 91).  Their 
explicit aims are to secure “higher taxes and royalties” for extractive practices (Fitz-Henry and 
Rodriguez 2020, 91). Once they receive these rents, or substantive revenues, Pink Tide 
governments and leaders “earmarked for redistribution to the poorest sectors of society via direct 
cash transfers or investments in health, infrastructure and education” (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez 
2020, 91). Instead of denouncing the foundation of extraction as a mode of development as 
expected from progressive governments, these governments tended to intensify extraction for the 
sake of social development.  
II. The Surge of the Pink Tide  
From the late 1990s to arguably the present, contemporary Latin American democracies 
have experienced the perception of a turn towards widely electing leftist governments in the 
region. This was not a surprising feat when considering the debilitating impacts of the debt 
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crisis6 and the Washington Consensus7 on Latin American society. With the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and the fall communism, leftist leaders no longer feared being ousted and killed in 
response to U.S. interventions in elections as communism was no longer a credible threat in the 
region (Rodriguez 2014). In conjunction with the abandonment of U.S. interventions was the 
further strengthening of democracy in the region. Latin America potentially distinguishes itself 
from other more authoritarian extractive states in regions like the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and 
the Middle East for exactly this reason. According to Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 477), “liberal 
democracy has been consolidated for three decades.” As political competition increased and a 
dominant state class had not emerged, leftists were broadly welcomed as a legitimate option for 
electoral contestation against rightists in the region.  
Such a widespread surge of leftist leaders elected in contemporary Latin America became 
known as “The Pink Tide.” The term originally arose in an article written by New York Times 
journalist Larry Rohter. Noting the less revisionist stances of the new leftist leaders, Rohter 
(2005) claimed that the election of Uruguay’s leftist president Tabaré Vázquez and other leftists 
in the region ushered in “not so much a red tide as much as a pink tide.” As communism is 
normally associated with the color red, the color pink was used instead to describe the 
governments of elected leftist leaders in the region who leaned towards socialism. Scholars like 
Cleary (2006) and Rodriguez (2014) pinpoint the beginning of the Pink Tide to the 1998 election 
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. A strong opponent of “savage neoliberalism” at least in speech 
 
6 The Debt Crisis of the 1980s known as “The Lost Decade,” was marked by hyperinflation and the lowest GDP 
growth since the Great Depression (Rodriguez 2014). Scholars have attributed this economic collapse to Latin 
America’s previous economic model, import substitution industrialization (ISI). ISI focused on the domestic 
expansion of markets to decrease Latin American dependence on developed countries.  
7 At the behest of the United States and the IMF, Latin America adopted a series of more conservative neo-liberal 
policies like “free trade, privatization, [and] cuts in public spending” known as the Washington Consensus of the 
1990s to restructure and repay their debt (Rodriguez 2014).  
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(Rohter 2005), Chávez wasted no time crafting a new constitution in 1999 which ushered in his 
drastic plans for social reform.8  
 His presidency would arguably inspire the election of other leftists in the region. Among 
the key Pink Tide presidents included the election of Lula da Silva in Brazil, the Kirchners in 
Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Though more moderate than 
Chávez, they seemingly shared his disdain for the stagnant economic growth, structural 
inequalities, and widespread poverty that continued to plague Latin American society. Figure 3.1 
displays a photograph of these leaders at the founding of the Bank of the South in 2007. At the 
Pink Tide’s peak in 2009, Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier (2013, 68) note that “fifteen out of 
twenty-one Latin American countries” were governed by a Pink Tide leader. This was a huge 
contrast considering that “in the 1990s, 64 percent of Latin American presidents were from a 
right-wing party” (Blanco and Grier 2013, 68). That number dropped to a mere 33% in 2009 
(Blanco and Grier 2013, 68). Thus, democracy appeared to be consolidated in the region.  
Figure 3.1 The “Waves” that Made the Pink Tide 
 
 
8 These were the Bolivarian Missions, a set of over thirty “social programs created to improve the living conditions 
of excluded groups in Venezuela by fighting illiteracy, providing access to education, supplying food at discount 
prices, and providing medical services to the poor” (Rodriguez Gallego 2016).  
 Ramcharan  26 
III.       Challenging Pink Tide Rhetoric  
One might think that with the election of Pink Tide presidents, the days of low economic 
growth and poverty would be remedied. Yet, Rohter (2005) noted vast contradictions in the 
objectives and actions of Pink Tide governments that allows one to question just how 
groundbreaking this Pink Tide proved to be. As expected, leaders were “sympathetic to the 
symbols and rhetoric of the left’s revolutionary past,” were “cosy with Fidel Castro,” and were 
“frequently anti-American in their talk.” Yet, “they continue to pursue economic policies that are 
favorable to American interests and sensitive to the perceptions of Wall Street” (Rohter 2005). 
For example, none of them made any moves to nationalize “foreign-owned companies” as 
leaders like communist Fidel Castro in Cuba and socialist Salvador Allende in Chile attempted to 
do with agrarian reform laws and U.S. copper interests (Rohter 2005). Though former Pink Tide 
President Lula da Silva of Brazil criticized neo-liberal policies, he “followed the same policies of 
fiscal restraint and openness to foreign investment” (Rohter 2005). Former Pink Tide President 
Rafael Correa of Ecuador had even maintained the dollarization of Ecuador in order to help 
Ecuadoreans keep their purchasing power (Rohter 2005). The move towards a reprimarization of 
the economy and increased ties with China actually increased dependence on capital, especially 
for raw materials (Blanco and Grier 2013).  A majority of them did not seem interested in or 
capable of changing the fundamentals of capitalism such as encouraging private property rights 
or having voluntary markets. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the ebbing of the Pink Tide as 
shown in Figure 3.2. Instead, they have seemingly shown their willingness “to play by the 
established rules of the game, even if it forces them to abandon cherished ideological goals” 
(Rohter 2005). It appears that Pink Tide leaders were not truly the socialists they painted 
themselves out to be as they have arguably moved towards capitalism.  
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Figure 3.2 The Ebbing of the Pink Tide 
 
IV.      Degrees of Extraction   
 Scholars Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and Kristina Dietz (2014) identified three consolidated 
extractivist strategies in contemporary Latin America. The first pertains to the Andean states that 
“traditionally show a very high share of ‘pure’ rents from raw materials” (Burchardt and Dietz 
2014, 473). Such states include Ecuador and Venezuela who receive their rents from oil, Peru 
and Chile who receive substantial rents from mining, and Bolivia who receives a considerable 
portion of rent from gas (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). Andean states will be considered highly 
extractive states. With the exceptions of Peru and Paraguay, these states tend to have a majority 
of years governed by Pink Tide governments as shown in Figure 3.3.  
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 In addition, other Latin American countries possess a “more diversified internal 
economic structure” (Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 473). This suggests that their extractive sectors 
are smaller relative to the Andean countries. However, it is clear that such sectors are becoming 
increasingly important. This can be observed in Argentina in the agricultural and mining sectors, 
as well as in Brazil with recent discoveries of new oilfields (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). 
Colombia seems to follow this pattern as well with oil and coal. Therefore, these countries are 
considered as intermediate extractors since more than a half of their exports are still extractive in 
nature as evidenced by Figure 3.3. Lastly, Mexico and the Central American states such as El 
Salvador and Nicaragua will be considered as low extractive states. Although their emphasis on 
extraction is not as apparent as in the Andean and other South American states, Mexico and 
Central America have recently shown trends towards that direction (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). 
This can be seen in Figure 3.3 in countries such as Honduras, Panama, and Guatemala. Though 
they predominantly include non-Pink Tide governments, some like Nicaragua have experienced 
Pink Tide governments.  
Figure 3.3 Exports of Primary Products by Pink Tide and Non-Pink Tide Governments 
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The Unsustainable Welfare State 
I.        Social Efforts Under Extractors 
As Pink Tide presidents tend to preach more egalitarian discourse when compared to 
non-Pink Tide ones, it would make sense for them to be higher extractors with higher welfare 
efforts. The more rents and revenue Pink Tide governments gain from extraction, the more 
financial resources they would have to fund social welfare programs than non-Pink Tide 
governments. Meanwhile, non-Pink Tide governments may tend to follow a more neo-liberal 
political and economic model that does not place strong emphasis on building a stable welfare 
state. In addition, their degree of extraction may tend to be lower than that of Pink Tide 
governments. Nevertheless, as noted in “Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” both of 
them have made considerable improvements in ensuring the well-being of its people.  
 Under highly extractive countries with predominantly Pink Tide waves of governments, 
they accomplished much in terms of social services and assistance. In terms of healthcare, 
Uruguay and Chile both made substantial moves towards universalism. Under Pink Tide 
Uruguay, “the state was introduced as the single payer” with “the creation of a unified fund that 
covers income and health risks” (Huber 2019, 19). Pink Tide Chile’s partially reformed 
healthcare in 2002 marked an important step towards equality as there was “guaranteed treatment 
for a specific set of illness” (Huber 2019, 19). In terms of pensions, Pink Tide Bolivia was able 
to introduce “a public citizenship pension for anybody over 60 years old” that was not a recipient 
“of any social security or other state financed pension” (Huber 2019, 19).  
 For intermediate extractive countries with both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
governments, they also made improvements in human capital formation. In Pink Tide Argentina, 
the government was able to make “the pension system public again” by “getting rid of the private 
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tier and greatly expanding coverage” (Huber 2019, 19). In terms of healthcare, Non-Pink 
Colombia had spent “private and public resources in a comprehensive insurance system” but 
made sure to add “some mechanism of solidarity and public cost control” (Fleury 2017, 3). 
Concerning conditional cash transfers (CCTs), Pink Tide Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program was 
able to serve “84 percent of the Brazilian poor” in 2008 (McGuire 2012, 206). A key area of 
progress for CCTs stemmed from the inclusion and empowerment of women into economic life 
(Blofield et al. 2017). With women, especially mothers being given access to their own income, 
governments were able to pursue their goal of increasing equality of opportunity in terms of 
human capital investment.  
 However, this is not to discount the accomplishments of low extractive countries with 
predominantly non-Pink Tide governments. In terms of CCTs, non-Pink Tide Mexico’s 
Oportunidades program in 2008 was able to serve “72 percent of the Mexican poor” (McGuire 
2012, 206). By instituting conditions for the receipt of funds, evaluations of the programs found 
“beneficial effects on income poverty, school attendance and enrollment, nutrition, height for 
age, child labor, and the utilization of basic health services” (McGuire 2012, 206). Mexico even 
expanded Seguro Popular9 to offer free health services to informal workers (Levy and Schady 
2013). By 2010, the program had covered more than 43 million people (Levy and Schady 2013). 
In non-Pink Tide Guatemala, providing poor children in their early childhood with a high-protein 
energy drink10 “improved chronic malnutrition, schooling, test scores, and men’s wages” (Levy 
and Schady 2013, 199). Non-Pink Tide Costa Rica has been known to have one of the highest 
welfare efforts in Central America with a unified public healthcare system and significant 
investments in education (Huber 2019).  
 
9 Seguro Popular is Mexico’s public health insurance program passed in 2003 (Levy and Schady 2013).   
10 The drink is called Atole and serves as a nutritional supplement for students in school (Levy and Shady 2013).  
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 Ultimately, Pink Tide governments appeared to prioritize “redistribution across class 
lines” which allowed them to deliver “better services and transfers and targeted a broader base 
than non-left governments” (Huber 2019). Yet, non-Pink Tide government human capital 
formation efforts should not go unnoticed. Therefore, it is baffling that “severe inequalities 
continue to exist in the quality of services provided” by Latin American countries (Huber 2019). 
In terms of social services, Holland and Schneider (2017b) note that upper income groups are 
exiting the public-school system and private education and health insurance is rising in the 
region. Approximate 40% of the middle class are enrolled in private education (Holland and 
Schneider 2017b). This can be attributed to the fact that upper income earners are not interested 
in paying taxes as they pay in the “private sector for their families” and then again “for public 
services for the poor” (Holland and Schneider 2017b). Therefore, social services are targeted 
towards excluded groups such as those with low income or indigenous groups. Yet, they are of 
very poor quality with “inadequate facilities” (Levy and Schady 2013, 199). This prevents them 
from living up to their full potential in relation to other more affluent groups.  
II.        Undoing the Semblance of an Extractive Welfare State 
 As noted in the previous two sections, both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide states appeared 
to have made substantial reductions in poverty throughout the 21st century using natural resource 
rents. Yet, the development of new welfare programs aimed at increasing human capital 
investment onto the traditional redistribution mechanisms has failed to address the stagnant 
societal structure that continues to remain in the Latin American society. Christened as “the 
elevator effect” by Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 475), this term alludes to the fact that “almost all 
social groups are moving up, but the structural composition of society remains the same.”11 
 
11 While this can be attributed to former President John F. Kennedy’s “A rising tide lifts all boats,” the tide seems to 
lift “super yachts” instead, as stated by New Zealand Labour MP David Parker. Gene Sperling, the former economic 
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While the extra income gained from extractive practices have been nationalized and used 
towards new anti-poverty programs, economic elites have still retained their power and wealth 
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014). In Latin American countries, there are little to no “tax reforms 
targeting wealthy asset-owners and land reforms establishing more egalitarian access to land” 
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 475). While the incomes of the poor have improved, its magnitude is 
negligible when compared to the rich who have seen a larger increase in incomes as Figure 3.4 
illustrates.  
The middle classes seem to be profiting the most from the neo-extractivism process while 
the rich gain more of the “spoils” from extraction. While the poor are better off than they once 
were, they are still relatively worse off as the rich benefit the most from excess profits. Not to 
mention that only 10% of transfer payments actually reach “the poorest fifth of the population” 
(Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 474). The rest went to “formally employed people with social 
security and thus higher incomes” (Burchardt and Dietz 2014, 474). Such a skewed distribution 
of profits from extractivism between economic elites and the lower classes warrant concern, 









advisor to Bill Clinton said that other boats “will run aground.” Economic growth, in this case through extractivism, 
tends to not benefit all people equally.  
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Figure 3.4 Poverty in Latin America  
 
 In addition to an inefficient allocation of profits from natural resources, an informal 
labor market is a source of one of the biggest market failures Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
welfare states must attempt to remedy if they hope to increase human capital investment. It 
should be noted that the labor market is already assumed to be Pareto inefficient in a welfare 
state. All gains from trade are not exhausted since there are people willing to supply their labor 
but few who demand it.  Everyone acting in their best interest does not create a well-off society 
in terms of human capital formation because people stay in the more profitable informal market 
with no access to substantive social protection. Firms do not formalize employment to create 
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contributory social protection schemes due to cost.  Resources do not go to their highest valued 
use because they are misallocated and skewed towards the profit maximization interests of 
extractive industries. Economic growth is not maximized since the labor force is not being used 
to its fullest extent. In the long run, this hurts the state’s interest in collecting tax revenues to 
fund human capital. Holland and Schneider (2017a, 994) note that the recent move towards non-
contributory social assistance programs has the ability to increase informal employment. While 
there is only preliminary empirical evidence of this phenomenon, most of the literature has 
supported this idea. In their review of several studies detailing the effects of noncontributory 
programs on labor market formality, Levy and Schady (2013, 204) find that “noncontributory 
social insurance programs function as a subsidy to informal employment because informal 
workers receive at least some of the same benefits as formal workers.” Yet a key difference 
stems in the fact that informal workers do not pay for these benefits “from foregone wages” 
(Levy and Schady 2013, 204). The generosity of such non-contributory programs actually seems 
to have negative implications for labor market formality. In Uruguay for example, Holland and 
Schneider (2017a, 995) note that “the CCT program adopted in 2008 is associated with an 11% 
decrease in formal employment.” While not a large decrease, this still undermines the role of the 
welfare state in correcting labor market informality.  
Though countries with Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments already maintain low 
tax burdens due to the vast revenue gained from extractivism, attempts towards formalizing labor 
markets must be made to generate a greater fiscal taxing capacity for these governments. After 
all, it seems counterintuitive for Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments to invest so much in 
human capital if there are little to no equal or employment opportunities or revenues generated, 
as well as other low returns on investment.  
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 Therefore, while numerous studies have focused solely on the state’s role in providing 
social welfare for its people, this paper primarily hopes to explore the mechanisms in which 
extractive industries indirectly affect the creation of the welfare state. In the next section of this 
paper, two key mechanisms, namely the extractive firm’s stronger influence on the state’s 
redistributive power and its inability to help the state fix labor market failure are identified in 


















 Ramcharan  36 
Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State  
Influencing the State’s Redistributive Power 
I.          Inequality of Opportunity 
 The elevator effect exacerbated by neo-extractivism breeds inequality of opportunity 
through the extractive firms' use of influence on the state’s decentralized decision making. As 
mentioned in “Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” decentralized decision making is 
integral to the human capital investment foundation of the welfare state as it allows all levels of 
government to have equal influence in deciding how to redistribute the gains from extraction. 
Unfortunately, this component of the welfare state is not compatible in the typical neo-extractive 
state. Due to the more pronounced ties between the state and its extractive firms as detailed in 
“Chapter III. Neo-Extractivism,” decision making is more centralized with less input from the 
local communities where extraction takes place. As these places tend to be remote, there is far 
more influence from the extractive industries. Therefore, neo-extractive states exert a nonchalant 
attitude towards oil or mining, instead opting to administer “the responsibility for addressing 
social demands” onto extractive industries (Acosta 2013, 68). Yet by allowing extractive 
industries to influence their redistributive power, both Pink and non-Pink Tide governments 
undermine any move towards greater human capital investment by curating clientelism and 
coercing complacency. 
II.         Curation of Clientelism  
According to McGuire (2012, 426), clientelism is the “the personal delivery, via a 
somewhat stable political network that extends from the politician to the voter, of divisible, 
excludable goods in exchange for votes or other kinds of political support.” While it has always 
been a problem throughout Latin American history through “the proffering of pork, state 
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patronage jobs'' or possibly in the case of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments, “cash 
assistance in exchange for votes,” clientelism becomes even more pronounced in the backdrop of 
neo-extractivism (McGuire 2012, 103). Governments, especially Pink Tide ones, often seek the 
support of extractive firms to finance human capital. Yet, these firms typically manipulate the 
political and economic landscape to work in their favor. In the context of rent-seeking, or the 
“pursuit of excess profits above market payoff that the government can create through legislation 
and regulation,” extractive firms enjoy a variety of privileges with no repercussions from the 
state due to its reliance on extraction (Halbac 2020b). Unfortunately, these privileges in the form 
of political rents result in social waste as extractive firms distort resource allocation with their 
influence on the state.  
Extractive firms are fully aware of their great importance in human capital development 
relative to other industries in the region as they are central drivers of economic growth. They 
often use it as leverage when negotiating with Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments. For 
example, the extractive industries’ interest in maximizing profits for the short term runs counter 
to the state’s interest in gaining the most money for human capital formation. Gudynas (2010, 5) 
reports that the mining industry in Brazil “enjoys exemptions from taxes” as “they [do not] pay 
the Circulation Tax on Merchandise.” Any “royalties and stocks of the Financial Contribution for 
Mining Exploration” that “go to municipalities are low” at about “1% to 3% of the liquid 
revenues” (Gudynas 2010, 5). The companies within the sector even make the calculations 
themselves (Gudynas 2010, 5). Often, natural resource rents are diverted from the typical Latin 
American welfare state into other countries which tend to be “tax havens” (Acosta 2013, 67). In 
Chile for example, profits from natural resource extraction that were sent out of the country by 
foreign businesses totaled “more than 25 billion dollars” (Gudynas 2010, 5). Due to its weak 
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capacity to enforce or monitor extractive practices or to ensure that natural resource rents are 
used domestically to improve human capital investment, Pink and non-Pink governments are 
unable to gain the full extent of spoils from extraction. Such a diversion of funds not only 
eliminates the potential for their allocation towards enhancing equal opportunity, but also 
consolidates an unstrategic and unbalanced partnership between the welfare state and its 
extractive industries.  
 Yet in the case of state-owned enterprises, the interests of governments and the extractive 
industry are seemingly one and the same. PetroEcuador, the 100% state-owned oil company of 
Ecuador, had signed a contract with PetroChina to sell 90% of its oil production until 2020 
(Garcia 2009). Former Pink Tide Finance Minister Patricio Rivera had said that China provided 
the financing for Ecuador and in exchange, Ecuador would sell its oil to them at international 
prices (Schneyer and Perez 2013). This does not appear to be anything of concern, until one 
considers that Ecuador was “shunned by most lenders since a $3.2 billion debt default in 2008” 
(Schneyer and Perez 2013). Having lost credibility on the international level, Ecuador had no 
choice but to give China almost exclusive rights and monopoly control of its oil. In return, China 
provided a $1 billion credit line at a very high interest rate of 7.25 percent to be repaid in two 
years (Schneyer and Perez 2013). Not only had Petroecuador given China the rights to its oil 
worth $13 billion, which was highly above what they could have received for it, but they 
prevented other buyers from purchasing it (Schneyer and Perez 2013). Such crowding out12 of 
private investments diverted a $12 billion profit that could have been directed towards building 
the welfare state. This did not work to maximize profits for the state-owned enterprise’s interests. 
Ecuador’s extractive industry reliance prevented it from renegotiating and securing more money 
 
12 The “crowding out effect” suggests that increasing government public spending may end up decreasing private 
sector spending.  
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for human capital formation. Meanwhile, PetroEcuador is unconcerned with maximizing profit 
since the state will provide it with the subsidies necessary to keep it operational.  Ultimately, this 
pure wealth transfer from Ecuador to China without China assuming more responsibility was an 
unproductive use of resources and detrimental for human capital investment as there were less 
funds to allocate towards this end. 
III.       Coercion for Political Complacency 
In such clientelistic partnerships, “resources distributed go to the most politically useful 
recipients” and not to its best use (McGuire 2012, 426). Yet, there are cases where extractive 
firms attempt to increase their human capital investment into less politically useful and excluded 
groups of society. In Bolivia for example, Newmont Mining Corporation, the majority owner of 
the Inti Raymi mine, had “created 700 jobs for Bolivian citizens,” paid “$8.2 million per year in 
salaries and benefits,” and spent “$18 million annually on local goods and services” (Gutierrez 
2007, 165). In addition, the company trained and educated its employees, as well as provided 
“full access to medical care for its employees” (Gutierrez 2007, 165). Such an expansion of 
equal opportunity within these communities appears to be commendable. Before the mining 
company arrived in the city of Oruro in the early 1990s, more than 70 percent of families lived in 
poverty and 84 percent did not have access to potable water” (Gutierrez 2007, 165).  Therefore, 
it is unfortunate that any gains to the local population in accessing health, education, and other 
public services were unsustainable in the long run.  
Locals such as the Quechua, Aymara, and Uru indigenous communities who practice 
subsistence farming and live near downstream from the Inti Raymi’s Kori Kollo gold mine now 
lack access to safe drinking water (Albuquerque 2014, 1). Ironically, indigenous communities 
had rightfully “filed over 900 official complaints'' over the fatal effects of the mine throughout its 
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duration of operation (Albuquerque 2014, 1). Yet concerns fell on deaf ears. It was only until 
2012 that the Bolivian government’s audit of the mine revealed the true impact of the Kori Kollo 
mine — “acid mine drainage; severe salinization of groundwater and soils; contamination of 
groundwater with cyanide, cadmium, zinc and copper beyond levels allowed in Bolivia” and 
“violations of several water quality laws” (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Environmental and economic 
damages were estimated to be $4 million (Albuquerque 2014, 2). By then, Newmont Mining 
Corporation had already sold the mine in 2009 and was still collecting royalties from it until the 
mine was finally shut down in 2015 (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Any employment generated was lost 
with the closure of the mine.  This implies that any human capital investments from extractive 
firms are not only as short-lived as the mine itself, but meant to temporarily encourage 
cooperation from local communities and validate extractivist practices.  As part of their influence 
on the state’s redistribution power, it is easy for the extractive industry to avoid responsibility 
and compensation for the negative externalities generated for their operations at the Kori Kollo 
mine, for example. As such, the management of redistribution becomes disorganized and 
ineffective as they face little to no repercussions not only from the indifferent attitude of the 
complacent weak state but the newly complacent excluded groups created.  
While extractive firms may allocate funds towards the empowerment of marginalized 
communities as shown in Bolivia, “benefits'' from extractive industries not only fail to accrue no 
substantive benefits to the welfare state but may come at the expense of community self-
determination. As these communities where extraction often lack access to many opportunities 
for quality education, healthcare, and employment, these groups have no choice but to accept the 
residualisitc extractive-based welfare state and remain complacent. If they do decide to mobilize, 
dissent, or vote as the indigenous communities did in this case, they risk losing whatever 
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minimal benefits they receive from extractive firms since they initially had none. In addition, 
these groups face repression from the extractive industry itself, sometimes backed by the state. In 
the case of the Kori Kollo mine, the state’s audit “provided no information to affected 
communities on when or how the mine site will be appropriately closed and restored, whether the 
pollution will be mitigated, or whether the impacted communities will be compensated for their 
loss of freshwater, among other harms” (Albuquerque 2014, 2). Damage to the land and well-
being is already done with no likelihood of remediation from the state or extractive firms. Such a 
feat further disempowers excluded communities and prevents them from realizing their full 
potential in the human capital centered welfare state, such as pressuring the government to 
provide more long-term equal opportunities, social services, or social assistance.   
Failing to Correct a Market Failure  
I.         High Labor Market Informality 
Perhaps the most important source of inequality and poverty today stems from high labor 
market informality. According to the International Labor Organization, about 56 million of Latin 
American youth from the ages of 15 to 24 are in the workforce (ILO). While 7 million of these 
youths are unemployed, 27 million of them work in the informal market (ILO).  As mentioned in 
“Chapter II. Latin American Welfare States,” a key component of the welfare state involves the 
role of the state in fixing market failures. Labor market informality is a market failure since the 
government is unable to generate tax revenues to fund human capital formation. This deepens its 
reliance on extractive industries for rents. Neo-extractivism does little to nothing in alleviating 
the informality of labor markets because of its weak capacity to create formal employment 
within Latin American society.  Such a feat is detrimental when one considers the value of 
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formal employment for human capital investment in terms of employment generation and 
collective bargaining.   
II.        The Low Skill Trap  
 The business preferences of firms in Latin America are different from European firms. As 
opposed to their European counterparts, Latin American firms generally do not view 
employment and social policy legislation favorably (McGuire 2012, 277).  Due to their highly 
skilled labor force and coordinated efforts to mobilize, European firms may be more willing to 
invest in human capital to generate the specific skills needed for optimal firm performance. 
Therefore, they might not have general problems with pressuring the government for labor or 
education reform. This is a sharp contrast to Latin American firms who do not rely much on 
formal labor and therefore, may not see incentives to develop human capital in the short or long 
term.  This generates what McGuire (2012, 277) refers to as the “low skill trap, where firms do 
not create high-skill jobs because they cannot find skilled workers, and workers do not invest in 
skill acquisition because they cannot find high skill jobs.” Consistent with rent-seeking practices, 
any strict labor regulations are also circumvented in an effort to maintain excess profits, 
especially in the extractive industry. Extractive firms are guiltier of this than other firms as they 
further foster Pareto inefficiency.  
According to Acosta (2013, 67), neo-extractive economies are enclaves in that they “are 
usually isolated from the rest of the economy.” As opposed to the telecommunications industry 
for example, extractive firms “do not generate employment on a large scale,” despite being large 
scale operations (Acosta 2013, 68). For example, only “0.5 to 2 jobs are directly created” in the 
case of large-scale mining for every $1 million invested (Svampa 2014). These industries not 
only generate little direct employment, but also generate little indirect employment as well. 
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Acosta (2013, 68) states that extractivist firms “are capital and import-intensive industries.” Any 
“inputs and technology they use are almost exclusively imported” (Acosta 2013, 68). Due to 
automation, these industries do not depend too much on labor, especially low skilled unless it 
pertains to local mining or agriculture in which they hire informal labor. When these extractive 
industries do require labor, “they hire skilled workers and managers” who often come from 
foreign countries as opposed to domestic ones who likely do not have opportunity to obtain the 
required skill sets (Acosta 2013, 68).  
Perhaps an even more daunting fact from the input process is that countries whose 
extractive firms play such a large role in redistribution do not integrate “primary export activities 
with the rest of the economy” (Acosta 2013, 65). This is due to the fact that these industries are 
typically based in “highly productive production,” while the other sectors of the economy may 
be “backward and subsistence-based” (Acosta 2013, 65).  For example, domestic sectors are 
unable to provide the sophisticated machinery or other inputs needed for oil drilling so extractive 
firms must import them. In addition, extractive firms do not usually process these resources as 
they lack refining capacity (Acosta 2013, 65). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Ecuador 
“imported approximately 122,000 b/d of petroleum products in 2016,” despite the fact that it is 
“the fifth-largest oil producer in South America” (Country Analysis Brief: Ecuador 2017). This 
not only lowers any oil revenue received by Ecuador but also implies that any profits cannot be 
allocated towards developing the domestic capital needed for the purposes of human capital 
investment. Instead, extractive firms are encouraged to extract more to sell on the world market 
to make up for lost profits.  
An absence of available incentives to create formalized employment opportunities stifles 
any attempts at creating human capital investment opportunities within the extractive sector itself 
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or other sectors. Latin American welfare states already experience labor market failure with 
widespread labor market informality. Yet, neo-extractivism only worsens the existing market 
failure by making little to no attempts in using the available labor force to its full extent. Such a 
move is demeaning for the Latin American welfare state whose central functions include fixing 
markets failures.  
III.       Subversion of Collective Bargaining  
In the cases where extraction is able to generate formal jobs with adequate social services 
like healthcare and contributory pensions, collective bargaining is often met with much 
resistance and little tolerance for dissent from the firm, especially in non-Pink Tide governments. 
While Pink Tide governments prefer the usage of state-owned extractive companies, non-Pink 
Tide governments prefer privatized ones. Non-Pink Tide Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro 
favors the privatization of Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras, eventually selling the 
Landulpho Alves Refinery (RLAM) in 2021 (Industriall 2021). Unfortunately, this contributed to 
the causes of “a 30-day strike” initiated by the Brazilian oil workers’ union FUP as the refinery 
“was sold for less than the minimum amount set by Petrobras” (Industriall 2021). Consistent 
with the rent-seeking practices mentioned earlier, this “resulted in large payments and bonuses 
for the company senior management” which raised doubts about the transparency of the sale 
(Industriall 2021). Instead of redistributing the money gained from the sale towards workers or 
perhaps investing in new training programs, extractive management opted for layoffs and 
pocketed the money themselves.  
This “drastic reduction of the workforce” ultimately “led to employees being 
overworked” and “increased the risk of accidents” (Industriall 2021). Workers are not also not 
allowed to use their face masks to protect themselves against Covid-19 if it has the union logo or 
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slogan denouncing privatization (Industriall 2021). Such actions result in union punishments like 
imposed fines. This not only implies the firm’s little regard for the worker’s health and safety, 
but also undermines the negotiated collective agreement. For example, the Landulpho Alves 
Refinery “suspended FUP leader Deyvid Bacelar for 29 days for leading the strike and is 
preparing to dismiss him” (Industriall 2021). Such intimidation tactics were performed “to 
dissuade other workers from taking action to protect their rights and their jobs” (Industriall 
2021). Through repressive actions like this, the extractive firm stifles the power of the union and 
prevents its workers from actively participating in the economic aspect of the welfare state. For 
example, the union believes “the actions by Petrobras management are violating ILO 
Conventions 9813 and 13514, both ratified by Brazil” (Industriall 2021). This insinuates that basic 
union rights are being undermined in a welfare state created to further human capital investment.  
Overall, extractive firms are uninterested “in fostering stable employment patterns or co-
operative relationships with labor on the shop floor” (McGuire 2012, 277). A reason for this may 
be the fact that employees are replaceable. Extractive firms know there is a large informal labor 
pool who would work for less than minimum wage if given the opportunity, with little to no 
complaints of the dangerous working conditions. As extractive firms are aware of their economic 
power, they face little pressure from the state who may depend on them to help provide 
employment for people.  Any incentives for investments into the longevity of workers is 
therefore ignored. Attempts of workers to contest the practices of extractivist firms fall on deaf 
ears similar to community complaints of extractive practices as mentioned earlier. This may 
discourage workers from exercising their economic rights as they know the enforcement of union 
contracts will not protect them from being fired. Ultimately, extractive firms do not cultivate an 
 
13 The right to organize and collectively bargain (ILO) 
14 The right of union representatives to be protected from dismissal (ILO) 
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environment conducive for effective economic participation by divesting any human capital 
investments and ignoring the will of workers. This makes it difficult for workers to act against 
repressive extractivist firm practices which contributes to a lack of human capital investment in 
the Latin American welfare state.  
The Unstable Gilded Welfare State 
I.          The Erosion of the Latin American Welfare States 
The term “gilded welfare state” was created to emphasize the predicted outcome of the 
interaction between neo-extractivism and the formation of Latin American welfare states in 
terms of human capital. There is no doubt that there have been improvements in the welfare state 
as evidenced by socioeconomic indicators and the widespread expansion of social programs. As 
explained in this paper so far, increasing equitable redistribution and fixing market failures are 
the core democratic and capitalistic foundations of the welfare state. In the 21st century Latin 
American welfare state based on human capital investment, inequality of opportunity and 
informal labor markets are the main sources of deep inequalities that continue to exist. Such 
problems are further exacerbated by the two mechanisms of neo-extractivism that hinder human 
capital formation – its large influence on the state’s redistributive power and its inability to 
create formal employment. Since the basic foundation of the Latin American welfare state 
appears to be undermined by neo-extractivism, it is unfitting to refer to them as true welfare 
states without acknowledgement of this finding. This concept is summarized in Figure 4.1. 
Therefore, while the literature seems to suggest a positive relationship between neo-
extractivism and human capital formation, this paper expects a negative association between the 
two variables. By establishing the mechanisms extractive industries use to indirectly impact 
human capital formation, this negative association should be stronger for Pink Tide governments 
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as opposed to non-Pink Tide governments since Pink Tide governments tend to extract more for 
the sake of human capital formation and their egalitarian discourse. All that glitters may not be 
gold, especially in the case of Latin American welfare states. By failing to properly incorporate 
vulnerable populations into political and economic life, both Pink and non-Pink Tide 
governments dependent on neo-extractivism risk undermining the very welfare state they hope to 
build.  
Figure 4.1 The Gilded Welfare State 
 
The next section of this paper aims to empirically assess this assertion by establishing a 
more direct linkage between neo-extractivism and the Latin American gilded welfare state using 
a simple quantitative OLS regression model.  
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Chapter V.  Medium-N First-Differenced Model 
Primary Determinants of the Gilded Welfare State 
I.         Pink Tide  
Since this is the first paper that attempts to quantify the Pink Tide, no previous 
operationalizations were available to use as a measure for this variable. While there are datasets 
measuring the legislative and executive ideology for Latin American countries, the missingness 
of many recent observations seems unconducive for analysis. Therefore, I used Blofield, Ewig, 
and Piscopo’s (2017) typology of Left governments in Latin America to create a Pink Tide 
dummy variable.  For each year during 1998 to 2018 in which a state is under the presidency of a 
leftist president, it is coded as “Pink Tide” with a value of 1. For each year during 1998 to 2018 
in which a state is not under the presidency of a leftist president, it is coded as “Not Pink” with a 
value of 0. Therefore, the Pink Tide variable reflects the leftist presidents’ position during the 
period of their government instead of the ideology that was adopted at the time of the 
presidential elections (Blofield et al. 2017).  The value of the Pink Tide wave variable does not 
change once a president’s term is completed and another president with the same ideology 
assumes power immediately after.  
This measure, while not arbitrary, may be susceptible to human error. Unlike variables 
with continuous data, this categorical variable is subjective in the sense that one’s classification 
of a Pink Tide president may be different from another’s classification of the same president. The 
time period begins in 1998 when Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela as he is 
widely considered as the first Pink Tide president in the literature. In addition, this paper will 
assume that the Pink Tide has not ended. Following the election of various rightist leaders in 
countries formerly exhibiting Pink Tide waves such as the 2015 election of Mauricio Macri in 
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Argentina and the 2016 appointment of Michel Temer in Brazil, it appears that the Pink Tide had 
officially ended in the mid-2010s. However, the election of leftist leaders in Bolivia, Argentina, 
and Mexico in the late 2010s and early 2020s suggests a resurgence of leftist leaders in the 
region. Particularly notable was the 2018 election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, a 
country which did not experience a Pink Tide wave within the twenty-year time period this paper 
will focus on. Therefore, this paper will assume the Pink Tide did not truly end.  
II. Extractive Industry Reliance 
Neo-extractivism is measured by extractive industry reliance. This is operationalized 
using the total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. This includes the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, hard and soft coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents (Total Natural Resource 
Rents). Figure 5.1 illustrates the total natural resource rents for each Latin American country. 
There appears to be much more variation in the changes of extraction for Pink Tide waves than 
in non-Pink Tide governments, especially in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela. With the 
exceptions of Colombia, Peru, and perhaps Mexico, the remaining non-Pink Tide waves have 
natural resource rents that are closer to 0% of their GDP. Nevertheless, the average natural 
resource rents between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries is 4.67%. As indicated by 
Figure 5.2, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 7.42% for resource rents, about 2.75 
percentage points above average.  On the other hand, non-Pink Tide waves in each country 
averaged 3.15% for resource rents, 1.52 percentage points below the overall average and 4.27 
percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. Overall, it seems that 
countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher resource rents than countries with non-
Pink Tide waves.  
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Figure 5.1 Total Natural Resource Rents in Contemporary Latin America 
Figure 5.2 Average Natural Resource Rents in Contemporary Latin America 
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Measuring the Gilded Welfare State 
I.          Human Capital Investment 
 Human capital investment is measured in terms of social services and social assistance. 
For the purposes of this paper, social services and social assistance will be operationalized using 
the expenditure approach based on variables found on the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), or in Spanish, the CEPALSTAT website. A 
central argument of Esping-Andersen (1990) involves his assertion that analyses of the welfare 
state should not focus too much on expenditures since it fails to capture the welfare state in its 
entirety. Instead, political economists should be more concerned with “how it is spent” as 
opposed to “how much is spent” (Filgueira 2005, 12).  
While this is a valid argument as it considers multiple dimensions of the welfare state 
instead of one, the expenditure approach is justifiable in the case of Latin America. For one, the 
levels of spending as a percentage of GDP are still relatively low and stagnant when compared to 
other developing states (Filgueira 2005).  In addition, Latin American states still show 
substantial variation in the amount of spending when compared to one another. For example, 
Venezuelan social spending in terms of education, health, and social protection was 18.8% of its 
GDP as compared to Panamanian social spending which was 8.2% in the same year of 2014. 
Though not without its flaws, expenditures are at least capable of showing the government’s 
commitment to human capital investment since it serves as an indicator of how valuable the 
government perceives human capital expenditure measures relative to the other areas of public 
investment. Therefore, it seems incomplete to consider other more sophisticated measurements 
of the welfare state such as the infant mortality rate or the literacy rate without focusing first on 
the basic criteria of human capital investment— the money.  
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1. Social Services: This will be measured in terms of the central government’s current health and 
education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Health expenditure in this context consists of 
the general government expenditure on health and private expenditure on health (Health). This 
includes the sum of all funds for health maintenance, restoration, and enhancement that was 
“paid for in cash or supplied in kind” (Health). Figure 5.3 illustrates the yearly health 
expenditures for each Latin American country. The average health expenditure between 2000 
and 2018 for all 18 Latin American countries was 6.82%. As illustrated by Figure 5.4, Pink Tide 
waves in each country averaged 7.40% for health expenditures, about 0.58 percentage points 
above average.  On the other hand, non-Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 6.45% for 
health expenditures, 0.37 percentage points below the overall average and almost 1 percentage 
point below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. Overall, it seems that countries with 
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Figure 5.3 Total Health Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
 
Figure 5.4 Average Health Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
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 On the other hand, education expenditure consists of the “current and capital 
expenditures on education by local, regional, and national governments, including 
municipalities” (Education). According to the ECLAC’s description of the education variable, 
any household contributions to education were excluded from the dataset and “expenses incurred 
by all ministries and levels of administration related to education” should have been included in 
the dataset (Education). Figure 5.5 displays the yearly education expenditure for each Latin 
American country for which there is data available. With the exception of Bolivia, the average 
education expenditure between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries was 4.15%. As 
indicated by Figure 5.6, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 4.36% for health 
expenditures, about 0.21 percentage points above average.  On the other hand, non-Pink Tide 
waves in each country averaged 4.05% for health expenditures, 0.10 percentage points below the 
overall average and 0.31 percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. 
Overall, it seems that countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher education 
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Figure 5.5 Total Education Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
 
Figure 5.6 Average Education Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
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2. Social Assistance: This is measured by the central government’s social expenditure as a 
percentage of its GDP in terms of health, education, and social protection. Though health and 
education are already included in social services as their own section of the mandatory budgets, 
these expenditures have a different function as a subsidiary of total social spending that in turn, 
supplement their expenditures as part of social services. For example, health expenditure in this 
case refers to the “disbursements for health services provided to individuals and groups'' 
(Indicators). Meanwhile, education expenditure includes the “disbursements at different levels of 
education, from pre-school to tertiary,” in addition to “ancillary services and research and 
development related to education” (Indicators).  Social protection expenditure consists of 
“disbursements for services and transfers to individuals and families'' that safeguard against risks 
faced by the entire population such as illness and unemployment (Indicators). Yet, the measure 
also covers against the risks that are associated with social exclusion such as inequality by 
including conditional cash transfers (CCTs). Figure 5.7 illustrates the yearly social expenditures 
for each Latin America country for which there is data available. With the exception of Peru, the 
average social expenditure between 1998 and 2018 for Latin American countries was 10.00%. 
As indicated by Figure 5.6, Pink Tide waves in each country averaged 11.44% for social 
expenditures, about 1.44 percentage points above average.  On the other hand, non-Pink Tide 
waves in each country averaged 9.08% for social expenditures, 0.92 percentage points below the 
overall average and 2.36 percentage points below the average of countries with Pink Tide waves. 
Overall, it seems that countries with Pink Tide waves appear to have higher social expenditures 
than countries with non-Pink Tide waves.  
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Figure 5.7 Total Social Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
 
Figure 5.8 Average Social Expenditure in Contemporary Latin America 
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Pink and Non-Pink Tide Wave Differences 
I.          Justification of First-Differenced OLS Regression 
 The first-differenced OLS regression of 33 observations considers the natural resource 
rents and expenditures for 1615 Latin American countries for each Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
wave.  The goal is to understand if there is a difference between Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
regarding changes in extractive industry reliance and human capital investment. The independent 
variable of extractive industry reliance was operationalized by the percentage change in natural 
resource rents from the beginning of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government to the 
end of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government. Similarly, the dependent variable 
of human capital investment was operationalized by the percentage change in expenditure from 
the beginning of each Pink Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government to the end of each Pink 
Tide or non-Pink Tide wave of government. A first-differenced OLS regression analysis was 
performed and displayed in scatter plots with 95% confidence interval bands.  Both 
measurements were calculated from percentages to dollar amounts based on the GDP at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars.  
Consistent with the literature and hypothesis, there should be an increase in the 
percentage of natural resource rents for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves since neo-
extractivism seems to be a dominant economic and development model for the Latin American 
region. According to the literature, this increase should be associated with increases in the 
percentages of human capital expenditures for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves since 
more rents should finance more investments. The hypothesis on the other hand suggests that an 
 
15 The Dominican Republic and Peru are excluded from both spending regressions. There was no data available for 
Peru regarding social expenditure and the Dominican Republic was an outlier in the analysis. Both Peru and the 
Dominican Republic were outliers for health expenditure and were excluded.  
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increase in the natural resource rents should be associated with decreases in the percentages of 
human capital expenditures. This is due to the mechanisms that were discussed in “Chapter IV. 
The Gilded Welfare State.” Consistent with both the literature and hypothesis, the magnitude of 
such increases or decreases in expenditures and rents should be larger for Pink Tide waves. This 
is due to an expected greater commitment from Pink Tide governments towards promoting equal 
opportunity through higher human capital investments but also the fact that they tend to be the 
highest extractors in the Latin America region as stated in “Chapter II. Neo-Extractivism.” 
While regressions were completed for health and social expenditures, it was not 
completed for education expenditures. Due to the high amount of missing data points for the start 
and end of each Pink or no Pink Tide wave, any results from a graph would probably not be 
representative of the entire sample. The number of observations is too small. Nevertheless, it is 
assumed that any percent changes in education expenditure and natural resource rents would 
be similar to that of the graph for health expenditure due to both of them being social 
services. They are also both funded by a combination of public and private provisions (Huber et 
al. 2008).  
II. Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending 
The results for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure 5.9. It seems 
that for a 1% percent increase in natural resource rents, there will be a 0.46% increase in health 
expenditure. This is consistent with the literature. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.48, there 
seems to be a moderately positive association between the two variables. Its intercept suggests 
that even if Latin American countries are not extracting, they will still have about a 50% increase 
in social spending.  
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Figure 5.9 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Health Spending by Wave 
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The disaggregated results of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure 
5.10. Interestingly enough, there is almost no association16 between natural resource rents and 
the health spending for Pink Tide waves. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there 
will be a 0.04% increase in health expenditure. This supports the idea of natural resource rents 
not being used efficiently. Yet, there are other possible reasons for this, the most important being 
that Pink Tide governments are already spending a high amount on health so their rents are spent 
in other areas of human investment that were not accounted for like minimum wage or 
environmental protections.  This may be more ideologically motivated than fiscally since Pink 
Tide governments may continue to spend at high levels, even if they have little resources 
available to them. For example, they may see health spending as necessary and may invest the 
same amount regardless of extraction.  
Perhaps most surprising is that non-Pink Tide governments behaved more like what was 
expected of Pink Tide governments. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there will be 
a 0.86% increase in health expenditure. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.72, there seems to 
be a strong positive association between the two variables. Perhaps this can be attributed to the 
fact that these governments are neo-liberal in nature and may not emphasize equity as much as 
efficiency. Perhaps they do not see the merit in enhancing equity through more human capital 
investments as a way to also increase efficiency so resources are allocated more Pareto 
efficiently than in a welfare state. In addition, it should be noted that most of these governments 
are low extractors so they may not have the money needed to increase health expenditure. This is 
further supported by the fact that Mexico, Columbia, and some Central American countries like 
Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras seem to be in a somewhat straight line. This suggests that as 
 
16 The Pearson Correlation coefficient is 0.07.  
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long as non-Pink Tide governments can finance social programs with natural resource rents, they 
will do so but when they cannot, they will not increase health expenditures. In addition, its 
intercept of 4.83%, is lower than the 99.77% intercept of the Pink Tide graph. This implies that 
even when the percentage change in resource rents is 0%, or there is no extraction, Pink Tide 
governments will still spend more on health than non-Pink Tide governments.  
III.       Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending  
The results for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide waves are shown in Figure 5.11 and are 
quite similar to the health expenditure graphs. It seems that for each 1% increase in natural 
resource rents, there will be a 0.31% increase in social expenditure. Based on the Pearson 
correlation of 0.38, there seems to be a somewhat weak positive association between the two 
percent changes. Its intercept suggests that even if Latin American countries are not extracting, 
they will still have about a 100% increase in social spending from other sectors of the economy.  
Figure 5.11 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending  
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Figure 5.12 Percentage Change in Natural Resource Rents and Social Spending by Wave 
Figure 5.12 shows the disaggregated results for the Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
governments. For each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there will be a 0.17 % increase in 
social expenditure for Pink Tide governments. Based on the Pearson correlation of 0.18, there is 
a weak positive association between the two percent changes. Yet, its intercept is 142.37% which 
is higher than the intercept for non-Pink Tide governments. This again supports the idea of Pink 
Tide governments spending more on social expenditures than non-Pink Tide governments at no 
levels of extraction. On the other hand, for each 1% increase in natural resource rents, there is a 
0.48% increase in social expenditure for non-Pink Tide governments. Again, the non-Pink Tide 
governments seem to have a proportional relationship between rents and social spending. Costa 
Rica is actually one of the states with the highest welfare efforts in Latin America, and the 
highest in Central America. Social expenditure in terms of social protection, education, and 
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health was 21.1% of its GDP in 2015 (Huber 2019). Therefore, it makes sense that for the little 
extraction it performs, it would have enough funds to contribute to social expenditure with its 
small size and small population.  
On the other hand, both Bolivia and Argentina are high extractors, yet their spending did 
not drastically increase within the non-Pink Tide wave. While this is consistent with Pink Tide 
cases instead of non-Pink Tide governments, the first wave in these countries happened earlier in 
the century just when the Pink Tide was starting to form. Non-Pink Tide governments were in 
power at the time. Argentina for example, experienced a great depression from 1998 to 2002 
after the Washington Consensus and its GDP had shrunk by 28% (Pascoe 2012). Over half of its 
population lived below the poverty line (Pascoe 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that there 
was a decrease in social spending in this wave as extraction was probably used to fund other 
areas. Such a depression also affected the Bolivian economy. Under the non-Pink Tide leader 
and former military dictator Hugo Banzer, neo-liberal policies were continued.  
A caveat of percent change graphs is that it does not fully capture the large increases in 
rents and expenditures within each wave. While this was not a problem for expenditure levels as 
they seemed to be relatively stable overtime, it was true for rents in some cases. For example, 
there is only one wave or data point for Pink Tide Venezuela and its initial resource rent as a 
percentage of GDP was 11.52% in 1998. Yet, resource rents reached its peak at 28.24% in 2005 
and decreased to 10.35% in the wave’s end in 2014.  
In the next section, other determinants of welfare state quality are considered in addition 
to extractive industry reliance and the Pink Tide. Using these economic, political, globalization, 
and demographic determinants, a large-N first differenced analysis was performed to further 
establish a closer relationship between neo-extractivism and the welfare state.  
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Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model 
Additional Determinants of Human Capital Expenditures 
I.          Economic Determinant 
In addition to the natural resource rents variable mentioned in the previous section, the 
economic variable that will be used for the large-N first differenced analysis is GDP per capita, 
PPP. This is measured with “per capita values for gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in 
current international dollars converted by purchasing power parity conversion factor” (GDP per 
capita, PPP). The choice of using PPP stems from the fact that it is “a spatial price deflator,” 
meaning that it “controls for price level differences between countries” (GDP per capita, PPP). 
As different countries have different currencies with differences in living standards, the PPP is 
essentially an exchange rate in which the currency in one country is converted into the currency 
of another country, in this case the United States.  Therefore, PPP considers the real sizes of 
Latin American countries as it enables one to thoroughly compare the economic output of 
different countries based on the standardized international dollar. The coefficient of this variable 
when running the large-N analysis is expected to be positive as noted in the literature (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2004; Huber et al. 2008; Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Such a prediction 
reflects Adoph Wagner’s “Law of Increasing State Activity” which suggests that “the demand 
for public services increases as countries become wealthier” (Haggard and Kaufman 2004). In 
this respect, more economic development will yield more human capital expenditure to fulfill 
social needs.  
II. Political Determinants 
 In addition to the Pink Tide variable, the political variables that will be used for this 
analysis include democracy and tax revenue. Democracy will be measured based on the 
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renowned Polity V score which is “computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the 
democracy score” and ranges from -10 to 10 (Coppedge et al. 2021). There should be a positive 
effect of regime type on human capital expenditures. Strongly institutionalized democratic 
countries, which are coded 10 under the Polity V measure, allow a wide range of electoral 
competition, power, and accountability over autocratic regimes (Huber et al. 2008). Essentially, 
politicians in a democracy have more of an incentive to generate increased human capital 
expenditures, especially since they face “higher social costs due to high electoral risks'' (Martin-
Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). In addition, democratic regimes must “consider the whole 
population in their welfare decisions'' so “the income of the median voter is lower” (Martin-
Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). This implies a greater need for social assistance and services from 
the government. On the other hand, strongly autocratic regimes which are coded -10, tend to 
repress any challenges to their power while allowing real wages to deteriorate and reducing any 
resources needed by its people (Huber et al. 2008). The income of the median voter in this case 
would be higher since human capital investment would be intended for the authoritarian regime’s 
“smaller group of supporters who benefit” (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 7). Therefore, it is 
expected that high Polity V scores may be associated with higher levels of human capital 
expenditures. Tax revenue will be measured by the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  
 Tax rates are traditionally low in Latin America as the region has limited tax capacity due 
to fragile institutions and high market informality. They depend on resource rents for financing 
instead. Yet, their fiscal commitments are high and Latin American governments face high costs 
when ignoring their constraints (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Therefore, it would be 
expected that higher tax revenues would finance more human capital investment.  
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III. Globalization Determinants 
The three globalization variables that will be used include trade openness, government 
debt, and foreign direct investment. Trade openness is measured by the total sum of exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP. Unlike Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) who adopted 
a nondirectional hypothesis for trade openness, this paper expects that high levels of trade 
openness will yield lower human capital expenditures. Trade dependent countries may face 
“pressures to maintain and upgrade human capital” from the international community (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2004, 18). Yet this does not seem true in the context of neo-extractivism as 
“Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State” suggests. In fact, the very essence of extractivism is 
based in the idea of trade since extractive countries are dependent on the global market to sell 
their primary products. Yet, commodity prices are volatile. Wibbels (2006) finds that this 
volatility causes sharp changes in the business cycle since governments have “limited ability to 
borrow from international markets during negative output shocks” and economic crises (Wibbels 
2006, 438). Therefore, governments may decrease human capital spending to balance their 
budgets as less revenue, or rents are gained from extraction.17 Government debt is measured by 
the central government’s debt as a percentage of GDP. It is expected that the higher a 
government’s debt, the more likely they will adopt austerity policies (Huber et al. 2008). It is 
highly likely that Latin America may hope to avoid high public debts, instead opting to increase 
taxes to fund spending or lower taxes and spending. Therefore, the coefficient of this variable 
should be negative since governments might aim to decrease human capital expenditures to 
avoid a further increase in public debt.  
 
17 Balancing budgets means that revenues equal expenditures.  
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The net inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP should have a 
negative effect on all human capital expenditures. Employers in the business sector would 
demand greater investment in education and health, for example, to “help them enhance [labor] 
productivity and thereby improve their competitiveness” (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017, 5). 
Therefore, governments are encouraged to protect against the greater volatility and risk to avoid 
political instability by essentially redistributing the gains from a globalized world and cultivating 
a more business-friendly environment (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017). Again, this does not 
seem to be the case as extractive firms do not seem interested in cultivating human capital as 
highlighted in “Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State.” Due to its extractive industry reliance 
and “shallow domestic credit markets,” Latin American countries are dependent on international 
financial markets to finance their fiscal budgets (Wibbels 2006, 444). As primary exports are 
volatile as stated before, exchange rate volatility is capable of decreasing foreign direct 
investment since investors tend to think of them as high risk. This would lower human capital 
expenditures.  
IV. Demographic Determinants 
The four demographic variables that will be used in the analysis include the urban, 
elderly, and youth population, in addition to the Gini Coefficient.18 The population variables 
should have a positive effect on the human capital expenditures. The urban population variable is 
measured by the percentage of the population that lives in areas defined as urban. Typically, the 
poor and excluded urban population has more access to health, education, or social expenditures 
in the form of CCTs for example, than those of a similar economic background in rural areas. 
Therefore, as the urban population grows, there will be more of a need to invest in human 
 
18 The Gini coefficient is endogenous, meaning that it is an effect of social spending but also a determinant of social 
spending. This may create bias in the analysis.  
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capital. The elderly population variable is measured as the population ages 65 and over as a 
percentage of the total population. As the aging population grows, more funds should be 
allocated towards health or retirement pensions which should increase social and health 
expenditures (Martin-Mayoral and Sastre 2017).  
On the other hand, the youth population variable is measured by the population between 
the ages of 0 and 14 as a percentage of the total population. As the youth population grows, more 
funds should be allocated towards primary health and primary education to better adapt to the 
demographic trend. Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) find this relationship, essentially 
noting that health expenditure increases with a higher youth population. The Gini Coefficient as 
a percentage variable controls for the levels of inequality.  As emphasized in “Chapter IV. The 
Gilded Welfare State,” high levels of inequality may encourage governments to reorient their 
human capital expenditures towards promoting inclusion, thus increasing health, education, and 
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Figure 6.1 Control Variable Descriptions, Data Sources, and Hypothesized Effects for Human 
Capital Expenditure Levels in Latin America 
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19 All data is missing for Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.  
20 Data is missing for 2018.  
21 Data is missing for Panama and several observations for Venezuela and Peru. 
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Statistical Tests for Latin American TSCS Data 
I.         Data Characteristics 
This paper uses the statistical computing software R to carry out any calculations and 
regressions of the collected time-series cross-section (TSCS) data. TSCS data is “characterized 
by having repeated observations of fixed units,” in this case Latin American countries, “with 
each unit observed over a relatively long time period” (Beck and Katz 1995, 634). There are 21 
observations for each of the 18 Latin America countries in the sample. This suggests that T, or 
the number of years in the dataset, are almost equal to N, or the number of countries data is 
available for. Latin American countries consist of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This leaves 378 observations 
from 1998 to 2018. However, many observations are missing for several variables due to their 
absence in the CEPALSTAT, World Bank, and IMF datasets. Therefore, this is an unbalanced 
dataset as the number of observations for each unit of analysis, in this case each Latin American 
country, are not the same.  
Figure 6.2 displays three boxplots for each primary variable of analysis.  There are not 
many outliers or leverage points. There seems to be no outliers or leverage points for health 
expenditure. The outlier for the education spending variable includes Costa Rica which spent 
7.32% of the GDP on education in a non-Pink Tide year of 2017 that was not much higher than 
the maximum expenditure on education. The outlier for the social spending variable includes 
Venezuela which spent 18.76% of the GDP on social spending in 2014, a Pink Tide year.  With 
the exception of Brazil during 2016 to 2018 in non-Pink Tide years, countries that also spent the 
most on social expenditure prominently experienced Pink Tide waves and included Chile, 
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Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. Most values in the resource rents variable are 
concentrated between 0 and 5% of GDP. Countries with predominant Pink Tide waves had the 
highest resource rents. This included Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia during the latter 
half of the 2000s decade. 
Figure 6.2 Boxplots of Primary Variables of Analysis 
 
As shown in Figure 6.3, this skews the distribution of resource rents to the right, or higher values 
while the distribution of the human capital expenditures appear to be more normal.22 Though the 
resource rents data points seem to be influential or contain high enough leverage to disregard 
them, these points will not be excluded from the analysis. This paper hopes to understand 
whether differences exist in Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide spending in relation to natural resource 
 
22 In hindsight, the logarithm of the natural resource rents variable should have been taken in response to the 
skewness in the data.  
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rents so excluding such points might be unfavorable for analysis if such substantial differences 
appear to be supported in the large-N analysis.  
Figure 6.3 Histograms of Primary Variables of Analysis 
 
II. Justification of First Differenced Estimation 
 
Several different OLS regression models were considered to explain the relationship 
between natural resource reliance and human capital expenditure. A pooled OLS model23 was 
initially considered. However, it does not account for the fact that the TSCS data points come 
from many different countries instead of one. When using TSCS, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation becomes a common concern as they bias any results and violate the assumptions 
for using the model (Hunter and Brown 1999). For example, heteroskedasticity means that “each 
country may have its own error variance” while the model imposes one error variance for all 
 
23 When running a pooled model, the coefficients were consistent with the first differenced model. The results can 
be found in Appendix A.  
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(Beck 2001). Autocorrelation means that “the errors for a given country are correlated with 
previous errors for that country” (Beck 2001). This means that the errors are not independent and 
identically distributed as the model assumes. A common method in the literature for addressing 
this problem is by using a lagged dependent as a regressor which eliminates autocorrelation, and 
then using panel corrected standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in the error term 
(Beck and Katz 1995). Attempts were made to use the lagged dependent variable as a regressor 
but the correlation coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was very close to one. This 
means that there is little change from one year to the next.24 It also suggests that the variable is 
integrated which suppresses the explanatory power of the other independent variable whose 
effects may also be significant in explaining human capital expenditures. Therefore, a lagged 
dependent variable was not used to perform the estimation.  
Instead, every independent variable was each lagged one year backward to account for 
the fact that any political or economic development “takes time to affect political decisions and 
policy outcomes” (Hunter and Brown 1999, 781). Each variable was then differenced which 
“eliminates a substantial portion of the cross-nation variation” (Hunter and Brown 1999, 785). 
First differencing25 also assumes “that something within the [country] may impact or bias the 
predictor or outcome variables” (Torres-Reyna 2007). Therefore, observable and unobservable 
time-invariant factors that are unique to each country are controlled for such as the country’s 
size, national policies, political system, and resource abundance (Torres-Reyna 2007). 
Though first-differencing the variables tends to only showcase the short-term effects 
from year to year (Huber et al. 2008, 429), this is justifiable in the case of this paper. As 
 
24 I appreciate Professor Weber for pointing this out.  
25 In this case, it is important to note that first difference estimators and fixed effects estimators are identical when 
using two time periods, or T=2, for each country-year unit of analysis.  
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spending levels seemed to have stayed the same in the long term, it may be more useful to 
understand how the election of Pink Tide governments in the region may have influenced human 
capital expenditures as opposed to non-Pink Tide governments in the region. After running the 
Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge statistical test26 based on the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
autocorrelation in the errors of the regression model, it confirmed that autocorrelation was no 
longer a concern for the data. Therefore, heteroskedasticity becomes the last area of concern. A 
Breusch-Pagan statistical test27 was run to test whether heteroskedasticity is indeed present in the 
TSCS. As expected, the test confirmed that heteroskedasticity was present which suggest the 
need for heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimators for robust standard errors. 
Therefore, heteroskedasticity was corrected using panel corrected standard errors as 
recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) and used by Hunter and Brown (1999), Martin-Mayoral 
and Sastre (2017), and Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008).  
Ultimately, this is the model used for the analysis: HCEXPit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1RENTSit-1+ 
𝛽2PINKTIDEit-1+ 𝛽3DEMOCRACYit-1 + 𝛽4GDPPCit-1 + 𝛽5TRADEit-1+ 𝛽6FDIit-1 +  𝛽7DEBTit-1 + 
𝛽8URBANit-1 + 𝛽9ELDERLYit-1 + 𝛽8YOUTHit-1+ 𝛽9RENTSit-1*PINKTIDEit-1 + ∈it, where HCEXPit is 
country i’s various types of human capital expenditures (health, education, and social) in period t, RENTS 
is natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, PINKTIDE is the presence of the Pink Tide, 
DEMOCRACY is the Polity V score, GDPPC is the logged GDP per capita (PPP, in current international 
dollars), TRADE is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, FDI is the net inflows of 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, DEBT is the central government debt as a percentage 
 
26 The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the errors while the alternative hypothesis is that there is 
serial correlation in the errors. Since the p-values of 0.59 for education, 0.52 for social, and 0.06 for health were all 
greater than the 0.05 significance level at, I fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude there is no serial 
correlation.  
27 The null hypothesis is that heteroskedasticity is not present, or that the data is homoscedastic. The alternative 
hypothesis is that heteroskedasticity is present. Since the p-values for education, social, and health were all less than 
0, I reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level and conclude that there is heteroskedasticity in the TSCS data.  
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of GDP, URBAN is the urban population as a percentage of total population, ELDERLY is the elderly 
population as a percentage of total population, YOUTH is the youth population as a percentage of total 
population. The last two terms are the interaction term of natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP at 
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Results of Human Capital First Differenced Model 
Figure 6.4 displays the results of the first differenced model run for each dimension of 
human capital investment.28  
Figure 6.4 Estimates of the Determinants of Latin American Human Capital Expenditure 
 
 
28 In order to use the fullest extent of the TSCS data, the Gini Coefficient and Tax variables were dropped from the 
primary analysis due to a large amount of missing data. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the variables did not change 
much when including them in the analysis. The results can be found in Appendix B.  
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I.         Determinants of Health Expenditure 
Overall, the adjusted R squared means that 44% of the variation in health expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent 
variables listed in Figure 6.4. Based on the model, the coefficient29 of the natural resource rents 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level. The non-Pink 
Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and health expenditure with a 95% 
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.5. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests 
that in non-Pink Tide governments, health expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.14 
percentage points, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of 
GDP increases by one percent. This is more impactful than in Pink Tide governments where 
health spending decreases by 0.05 percentage points on average per country-year. Though this is 
consistent with the hypothesis as natural resource rents are expected to have a negative effect on 
health expenditure, it is inconsistent as the negative effect should have been stronger for Pink 



















29 The coefficients are not t-values. 
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The Pink Tide variable is also statistically significant at the 0.10 significance level. Its 
coefficient is negative instead of positive. This is consistent with the hypothesis but can be 
attributed to other reasons that will be addressed in “Discussion of Results.” The marginal effects 
plot for the Pink Tide variable and health expenditure as a share of GDP is shown in Figure 6.6. 
On average per country-year, it is expected that health expenditure as a share of GDP in Pink 
Tide governments will be 0.64 percentage points less than non-Pink Tide governments at the 
same level of natural resource rents. Again, this runs contrary to the hypothesis as the negative 
effect should have been stronger for Pink Tide governments.  
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Interestingly enough, the interaction term between the Pink Tide variable and natural 
resource rents is significant at the 0.05 level. The interaction plot for natural resource rents and 
the Pink Tide variable is shown in Figure 6.7. The intercept for countries with non-Pink Tide 
waves is 9.62% while the intercept for countries with Pink Tide waves is lower at 8.72%. At low 
values of natural resource rents, countries with non-Pink Tide waves spend more on health than 
Pink Tide governments.  At high values of natural resource rents, countries with Pink Tide waves 
spend more on health than countries with non-Pink Tide waves. Based on the interaction, it 
seems that Pink Tide governments tend to maintain more consistent levels of expenditure since 
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its slope of -0.04 is less steep than that of non-Pink Tide cases. There is no overall effect of 
either the Pink Tide or natural resource rents, but there is a crossover interaction. The effect of 
Pink Tide on health expenditure is the opposite, depending on the value of natural resource 
rents.  
Figure 6.7 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Health Expenditure  
 
 
II. Determinants of Education Expenditure  
The adjusted R squared means that 64% of the variation in education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent 
variables listed in Figure 6.4. This is higher than the R squared of the health model. According to 
Figure 6.4, the natural resource rents variable is not statistically significant. Though it is negative 
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as expected, its coefficient is much closer to 0 than the health expenditure model. This suggests 
that natural resource rents may have little to no effect on education expenditure. The non-Pink 
Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and education expenditure with a 95% 
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.8. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests 
that in non-Pink Tide governments, education expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by 
0.02, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP increases 
by one percent. This insignificant impact is less in Pink Tide governments where education 
spending as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.04 percentage points on average per country-
year. This is consistent with the hypothesis but not with the literature.  
Figure 6.8 Marginal Effects Plot for Natural Resource Rents and Education Expenditure 
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The coefficient of the Pink Tide variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance 
level. Yet unlike the health expenditure model, the coefficient of the Pink Tide variable is 
positive. This does not support the hypothesis presented in this paper, but it does support the 
literature. The marginal effects plot for the Pink Tide variable and education expenditure is 
shown in Figure 6.9. On average per country-year, it is expected that education expenditure as a 
share of GDP in Pink Tide governments will be 0.32 percentage points greater than non-Pink 
Tide governments at the same level of natural resource rents.  
Figure 6.9 Marginal Effects Plot for Pink Tide and Education Expenditure  
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 The interaction plot of the education interaction has almost parallel lines instead of 
intersecting ones, suggesting that it did not behave like health like previously thought in 
“Chapter V. Medium-N First Differenced Model.” It seems that in the case of education, the Pink 
Tide did have a significant albeit negligible effect on how much a government spends on 
education in terms of resource rents as these governments seem to spend more than non-Pink 
Tide ones.   
Figure 6.10 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Education Expenditure 
 
III. Determinants of Social Expenditure  
According to the adjusted R squared, 57% of the variation in social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP within Latin American countries can be explained by the independent 
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variables listed in Figure 6.4. Based on the model in Figure 6.4, the coefficient of the natural 
resource rents variable is negative like in the health model but statistically insignificant. The 
non-Pink Tide marginal effects plot for natural resource rents and social expenditure with a 95% 
confidence interval is shown in Figure 6.11. Holding the other variables constant, this suggests 
that in non-Pink Tide governments, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.05 
percentage points, on average per country-year, when natural resource rents as a percentage of 
GDP increases by one percent. This has about the same impact as Pink Tide governments where 
social spending as a percentage of GDP decreases by 0.04 percentage points, on average per 
year. This is consistent with the hypothesis as natural resource rents are expected to have a 
negative effect on social expenditure. Like the education model, the coefficient in this model is 
closer to 0 which suggests resource rents has almost no effect on social expenditure.   
Figure 6.11 Marginal Effects Plot for Natural Resource Rents and Social Expenditure  
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Like the natural resource rents variable, the Pink Tide variable is also not statistically 
significant. Its coefficient is negative instead of positive which supports the hypothesis. The 
marginal effects plot for the Pink Tide variable and social expenditure is shown in Figure 6.12. 
On average per country-year, it is expected that social expenditure as a share of GDP in Pink 
Tide governments will be 0.09 percentage points less than non-Pink Tide governments at the 
same level of natural resource rents.  




The interaction term between the Pink Tide variable and natural resource rents is 
statistically insignificant. The interaction plot for natural resource rents and the Pink Tide 
variable is shown in Figure 6.13. The intercept for countries with non-Pink Tide waves is 7.83% 
while the intercept for countries with Pink Tide waves is lower at 7.64%, but not by much. At 
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very low values of natural resource rents, countries with non-Pink Tide waves spend more on 
health than Pink Tide governments.  At medium to high values of natural resource rents, 
countries with Pink Tide waves spend more on social expenditure than countries with non-Pink 
Tide waves. The difference in the slopes is 0.02. Based on the interaction, it seems that Pink Tide 
governments may tend to maintain more consistent levels of expenditure since its slope of -0.08 
is less steep than that of non-Pink Tide cases. There is no overall effect of either the Pink Tide or 
natural resource rents, but there is a crossover interaction. The effect of Pink Tide on social 
expenditure is the opposite, depending on the value of natural resource rents.  
 
Figure 6.13 Interaction Plot for Pink Tide and Natural Resource Rents on Social Expenditure  
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Discussion of Results 
I.         A Recap of Results 
Overall, the first differenced model has failed to provide any strong evidence for natural 
resource rents affecting human capital investment. The results even ran contrary to the results 
presented in “Chapter V. Medium-N First Differenced Model” which found a positive 
relationship between natural resource rents and human capital expenditures. Perhaps the 
introduction of the control variables or large-N model specifications can best explain this 
contradiction. Yet though insignificant, similar studies have also found a negative relationship 
between the variables (Turan and Yanikkaya 2020; Oyinlol et al. 2019; Blanco and Grier 2012). 
In their study of more than 100 countries during 1980 to 2015, Turan and Yanikkaya (2020, 449) 
disaggregated the natural resource rents variable into oil, mineral, and gas rents and found that 
though not significant, rents had an “adverse effect on the human capital.” Consistent with 
Blanco and Grier (2012) who performed an analysis of 17 Latin American countries between 
1975 and 2004, their results were negative but inconclusive as well.  
 This negative relationship can also be explained by the most prominent theory concerning 
extraction and the political economy — the Resource Curse.30 According to the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (2015, 1), the resource curse “refers to the failure of many resource-rich 
countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth.” While it is expected that such 
countries are able to improve the standards of living, these countries instead “tend to have higher 
rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic stability and economic 
growth” when compared to countries without natural resource discoveries (NRGI 2015,1). 
Therefore, the government has a limited ability to capture the true benefits of extraction and 
 
30 This is also known as the “paradox of plenty.” 
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substantively respond to the needs of its constituents as shown in Figure 6.14 and explained more 
fully by the mechanisms identified in “Chapter IV. The Gilded Welfare State.”  
Figure 6.14 “Oversight Incentives in Resource-Rich and Resource-Poor Countries” 
 
II.        An Unexpected Economic Efficiency 
It is also possible that neo-extractive funds were allocated into other areas of human 
capital expenditure that were not considered in this paper. This paper only considers health, 
education, and social expenditure as measurements of human capital investment. Yet, there are a 
myriad of human capital investment opportunities for both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide 
governments. For one, governments could have funneled excess profit and revenue from 
extractivism into job training or even minimum wage. In 2008, natural resource rents in Brazil 
had reached its peak at 6.18% of the GDP. About a year later during the presidency of Brazil’s 
Pink Tide President Lula da Silva, the minimum wage was raised from 415 reals to 465 reals 
($200.95), a 6.4% increase in 2009 (Reuters Staff 2009). This injection of 21 billion reals into 
Brazil’s economy suggests that the state had the financial means to invest in its working 
population, possibly from its gains in natural resource rents (Reuters Staff 2009). In a similar 
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guise, social expenditure which was used as a dependent variable in this paper was measured 
only in terms of health, education, and social protection. Yet, there are other dimensions of the 
variable that were not included in the analysis such as housing and housing amenities 
(Indicators). Ensuring that everyone has equal access to housing and “constructing and 
remodeling” housing “for the general public or persons with special needs” supports the idea of 
Latin American welfare states allocating more extractive funds into this area of human capital 
formation. Therefore, the negative relationship between extractive industry reliance and human 
capital investment could be attributed to a larger economic pie, one that may potentially decrease 
the amount of health, education, and social expenditure as a share of GDP while actually 
increasing other areas of human capital expenditures in the economy.  
III.       Differences in Expenditures 
As the model in “Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model” has also indicated, the 
human capital expenditures appear to be inconsistent in the presence of the Pink Tide. For 
example, the positive statistically significant coefficient of the Pink Tide variable when 
considering education expenditure is particularly noteworthy as it conforms to the literature. 
Though it was expected that education would behave like health as they are both social services, 
the results suggest that Pink Tide governments seem to spend more on education. Perhaps they 
noted the “high political cost in education” as it pertains to teacher unions and students (Holland 
and Schneider 2017b). Key aspects of the Pink Tide included increasing equal opportunity and 
socioeconomic mobility through education. Facing political pressures from students and teachers 
who would protest public education funding and inequality31, Pink Tide governments would 
probably feel more pressure to invest in education than deal with the creation of social 
 
31 For example, Chile in 2011-2013 faced massive student-led protests. Students demanded the end of the Chilean 
school voucher system, better financing for education, and more state management of the public education system.  
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movements. This may explain why Pink Tide governments allocated more expenditure into 
education than non-Pink Tide governments. In addition to this, the statistically significant 
coefficient of the natural resource rents coefficient when considering health expenditure is 
steeper when compared to the coefficients for education and social spending. When governments 
receive any revenues, it is possible that they funnel it into health expenditures due to the “high 
economic cost” (Holland and Schneider 2017b). Therefore, they are more likely to invest the 
money into more visible projects like building hospitals. It is possible that when receiving 
natural resource rents, governments have already secured more stable sources of financing like 
taxation for health as it is a high priority for politicians and constituents. Therefore, they use the 
rents to finance other areas. 
IV.       A Calm Pink Tide  
 On the other hand, there may not be much of a difference between countries with Pink 
Tide waves and countries with non-Pink Tide waves in terms of extraction as the findings of the 
model suggest. Holland and Schneider (2017a, 989) highlight that “political competition and 
partisan swings leave much unexplained.” This suggests that attributing any changes in human 
capital expenditure cannot merely be explained by whether the government is Pink Tide or not. 
There are countless other factors that can affect expenditures that were not used in this model 
such as the amount of tax revenue collected, unemployment, and inflation rates. In addition, non-
Pink and Pink Tide governments both “reduced inequality, expanded social spending, and 
introduced targeted poverty-relief programs in the 2000s” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 989). 
Indeed, this is true. Policies such as CCTs and NCPs that are “popular and electorally beneficial” 
were passed by both Pink and non-Pink Tide governments and “few politicians, from the Left 
and the Right, can afford to revoke them” (Holland and Schneider 2017a, 1000). In addition, 
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these CCTs and NCPs were passed by both Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments due to 
their versatile characteristics. For one, Holland and Schneider (2017b) note that implementing 
these programs was easy since they were not costly to implement due to ATMs. As both 
governments are electorally motivated, it would be no surprise to see that human capital 
investments into CCTs or NCPs would happen at faster rates than in health, education, minimum 
wage, or other areas. In addition, the Pink Tide does not seem to affect natural resource rent 
extraction and therefore, may not have a significant impact on human capital investment.  
V.        Unaccounted Exogenous Shocks  
 The model in “Chapter VI. Large-N First Differenced Model” notably does not account 
for any exogenous shocks that may have influenced how natural resource rents affect human 
capital investment. Accounting for the 2008-2009 world financial crisis using a dummy variable 
in the analysis was considered. However, it was ultimately decided against since most Latin 
American states in the region were resilient during this shock. Perhaps Latin America learned its 
lessons from its 1980s debt crisis as it was able to largely shield itself from macroeconomic 
instability “with much better monetary policy, substantially lower fiscal deficits, and improved 
debt management” (Levy and Schady 2013, 193). Accounting for the Commodities Boom of 
2002 to the early 2010s with a dummy variable should have also been considered. It should be 
noted that the election of Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments in the region also coincided 
with a high international demand for natural resources and commodities as China’s economy 
grew (Blanco and Grier 2013). When the boom was over, it was possible that Latin American 
countries had to find other sources of financing for its social programs that were not extraction 
centered and if they failed, that would probably be detrimental to forming their welfare state.  
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 Considering the results and discussion of this section, this paper will highlight some of 
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Chapter VII. Conclusion  
 Set at the backdrop of neo-extractivism when Pink Tide governments exercised greater 
state control over the appropriation of natural resources, this paper attempted to evaluate the 
extent to which extractive industry reliance in Latin America affects the formation of welfare 
states. Using a human capital perspective on the welfare state, this paper placed a strong 
emphasis on the role of extractive industries in forming human capital. While the literature 
suggested a positive association between extractive industry reliance in terms of natural resource 
rents and human capital investment in terms of health, education, and social expenditures, this 
paper challenged that assertion using the “gilded welfare state.” Through the use of two 
mechanisms, namely the extractive industries’ large influence on the state’s redistributive power 
and its inability to generate formal employment in Latin American society, this paper shows that 
despite widespread social improvements, neo-extractivism may be unable to add substantive and 
long-lasting benefits to the welfare state. This paper did not find conclusive results of the 
relationship between natural resource rents and human capital formation since the medium-N 
first differenced model showed evidence of a positive relationship while the large-N first 
differenced model showed evidence of a negative relationship. Yet, it does suggest that neo-
extractivism should not be discounted from conversations concerning the development of the 
welfare state.  
 More mechanisms of extractive industries should be identified and tied to human capital 
formation in the welfare state. Only two were uncovered in this paper, namely the extractive 
industries’ influence on the state’s redistributive power and its ability to generate employment 
within Latin American society. Yet, there are a myriad of other mechanisms that extractive 
industries may use to shape the welfare state. For one, the ownership of extractive firms may 
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have differing impacts on human capital formation in terms of providing equal opportunity and 
employment. Comparing nationalized and privatized extractive firms may hold some insight into 
why some extractive industries are more able to integrate excluded communities than others. 
This can be done by applying the principle-agent model to understand the inner workings of the 
extractive firm such as the quality of management, the enforcement of human capital initiatives, 
and the structure of the decision-making processes.  
In a future iteration of this project, it would be useful to compare human capital 
expenditures to a category of non-welfare spending. This may provide some insight into the 
extent to which Pink Tide and non-Pink Tide governments prioritize human capital formation 
relative to categories of non-human capital formation. This may include categories such as 
national defense, infrastructure, or even transportation. Disaggregating human capital 
expenditures would help one better understand how human capital expenditures associated with 
natural resource rents are distributed. As Hunter and Brown (1999, 789) suggest, education 
expenditures should be “disaggregated into primary and secondary versus university education” 
while “health expenditures need to be broken down into basic preventative care versus costly 
curative programs.” This would aid researchers in understanding whether resource rents are 
allocated towards programs, services, or assistance aimed at increasing equal opportunity for the 
poor as opposed to programs favorable to the upper and middle classes. It would be useful to 
understand who truly benefits from the allocation of rents in terms of human capital expenditure 
and whether extractive industry reliance is able to empower traditionally excluded communities. 
 Yet instead of using the expenditure approach as a measurement of human capital 
investment, alternate measures of the dependent variable should be used in future research. As 
stated before, the issue with expenditures rests on the fact that they measure how much is spent 
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rather than how it is spent. Therefore, it would be beneficial to consider other more sophisticated 
measures of human capital formation such as primary school enrollment, infant mortality rate, 
and total social spending. Of course, other perspectives other than the human capital formation 
aspect of the welfare state should also be considered such as decommodification and 
stratification. The welfare state entails multiple dimensions instead of just the one mentioned 
throughout this paper.   
Future research should also consider using neo-extractivism as the basis of a new 
typology of welfare states in Latin America. This may make it easier to compare and understand 
Pink and non-Pink Tide welfare efforts in the Latin American region. For example, Filgueira 
(2005) had used the characteristics of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, the 
dominant development and economic model of Latin America before the emergence of export-
oriented industrialization (EOI) and later, neo-extractivism. He finds three types of welfare 
states, or what he calls social states, based on the economic inclusivity of the model and its 
interaction with “the organization and response elites have to the pressure of subordinate sectors” 
(Filgueira 2005, 10). These include “stratified universalistic, dual and exclusionary” (Filgueira 
2005, 10). As this typology is outdated since it focuses on the path dependence of the states until 
1970s, perhaps a similar continuum can be applied to the concept of neo-extractivism in the 
contemporary setting. It has been shown throughout this paper that neo-extractivism as an 
economic and developmental model has at least some impact on human capital formation 
whether positive or negative. By considering the degrees of influence neo-extractivism has on 
the state’s redistributive process and the extent to which it can create employment opportunities, 
this new typology may be key to understanding the variation of Latin American welfare state 
formation.  
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 In partnership with governments, extractive industries must move beyond short-term 
CSR practices towards long term development plans that empower traditionally excluded 
communities in the welfare state. Less than 10% of workers are women in Latin America’s 
mining industry while less than 15% are directly and indirectly employed in the oil and gas 
industries (Calot and Vallenilla 2018). Therefore, the mining, oil, and gas industries in Peru 
launched the first “Program for Emerging Women Leaders of the Extractive Sector” in 2018 with 
the support of the Canadian government and the Inter-American Development Bank (Calot and 
Vallenilla 2018). Its aims are “to promote more women in managerial positions and serve as a 
multi-actor collaborative platform that can take advantage of existing national initiatives and 
promote gender equality” (Calot 2018). The program which trains women from the public and 
private sectors has resulted in promotions for 52% of them and short-term job rotations for 38% 
of them (Calot and Vallenilla 2018) This economically empowers women as they are able to 
obtain the high skillset needed for formal employment. Such an initiative seems profitable for the 
industry as well since Panama and the Dominican Republic have adapted it for their public 
sectors. In addition, having women participate in the extractive industry yields better outcomes 
for human capital formation. As opposed to men who tend to focus on extractive firms providing 
infrastructure such as roads and buildings, women tend to ask for “better health and education 
outcomes by improving services at existing facilities” (Calot and Vallenilla 2018). Such a move 
towards human capital investment by the extractive industry benefits all parties.  
 A strengthening of the quality of existing institutions should also be warranted as 
suggested by this paper. All too often, it is difficult to monitor where the revenues from natural 
resource extraction will be allocated or how the revenues will be managed. As seen in “Chapter 
IV. The Gilded Welfare State,” this creates an atmosphere of corruption that prevents the state 
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from receiving the full spoils from extraction. In a move towards increased transparency, both 
Pink and non-Pink Tide governments must encourage extractive industries to disclose 
information pertaining to its chain of decision making. In addition to reporting the amount of 
revenue gained from extraction, extractive industries must also disclose the location and duration 
of projects, tax rates, and payments. Contracts should be made public with the avoidance of 
confidentiality clauses and concessions approved by government legislatures. While not an 
exhaustive list, this should at least increase the accountability of extractive industries as 
governments and the public will be more able to scrutinize extractive firm practices. 
Burchardt and Dietz (2014, 478) note that it would be useful for the political economy of 
Latin America if there was some way to turn the quantitative increase in natural resource rents 
“into a qualitative form of redistribution and a permanent expansion of social rights, formalized 
employment, and stable social participation.” Perhaps most interesting is Paul Segal’s (2009, 1) 
study in which he explores the possibility of each country distributing its natural “resource rents 
directly to its citizens as a universal and unconditional cash transfer.” With his model, it is 
expected that “if every developing country implemented the policy then the number of people 
living below the World Bank’s $1-a-day global poverty line would be halved” (Segal 2009, 1) 
While not a completely radical idea at this point, this would only contribute to the issues 
highlighted in this paper. For one, cash transfers do not seem to add lasting and substantive 
benefits to welfare state formation. It may further disincentivize people to become formal 
workers with taxing capacity and legitimize neo-extractivism as the key source of social 
development. Perhaps the creation of a new institution to ensure better allocation of natural 
resource rents and prioritization of the well-being of communities in the spheres of extraction is 
needed. For example, Ecuador created Ecuador Estratégico (EE) which is “a public company 
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founded by the government in 2011 and tasked with providing compensation to communities'' 
who were directly affected by extractive industries (Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez 2020, 90). Yet, 
this also further legitimizes the idea of exploiting the earth as a means for social development 
which as this paper suggests, does not seem to actually work.  
 Latin American citizens have become more aware of the environmental, political, 
economic, and social ramifications of extraction and have actively been working against 
extractive projects. In Chile for example, both the $3.2 billion “mega-hydroelectric Hydroaysen 
project” and the $8.5 billion “Pascua Lama gold mine” were cancelled due to widespread 
protests over environmental concerns (Grantham Institute 2021). In Colombia, 98% of the 
residents of rural Cajamarca including Afro-Colombians and peasant farmers voted against the 
La Colosa mine despite death threats from the extractive firm, AngloGold Ashanti (Moore 
2017). Yet, extractive industries and firms should not violently suppress these movements or 
exercise of political power. Instead, they must learn to respect the social and property rights of 
these communities for the survival of the region. 
 Ideally, moving towards more sustainable initiatives will yield a post-extractive world in 
which nature is abandoned as a means to an end for social development. This must undoubtedly 
be the goal for policymakers, governments, extractive firms, and communities as Latin America 
endures the threat of two seemingly incurable ills — climate change and inequality. Extraction 
worsens both of these ills as it threatens diverse ecosystems and displaces vulnerable 
communities. Latin America is already bearing the brunt of climate change with temperatures 
“projected to rise between 1°C to 4°C by the end of the century” (Cavallo 2020). Millions have 
already been affected by severe climate-related events such as more frequent and intense 
hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, and flash flooding. Yet, the impact of such natural disasters 
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disproportionately falls on the poor as they “are more vulnerable and less prepared” for such ills 
(Cavallo 2020). There must be ways to mitigate extraction and work towards more sustainable 
initiatives as a means towards building a more sustainable welfare state. Unlike extractive 
industries, excluded communities may be able to provide the technological innovations needed to 
alleviate these ills. Due to climate change, wet seasons are wetter and dry seasons are drier. Drier 
seasons are not ideal for local excluded farmers as they depend on safe drinking water for their 
crops and animals. In order to improve water security in coastal Peru, local Ecuadorian scientist 
Dr. Boris Ochoa-Tocachi hopes to extend the wet season by using the irrigation systems of pre-
Incan indigenous communities (Grantham Institute 2021). This not only empowers excluded 
communities who have unique insight into such issues. It also demonstrates how indigenous 
knowledge can creatively be integrated with modern science to adapt to an unpredictable climate.  
Yet, the move towards a post-extractive world cannot be completed overnight. Such a 
transition requires unwavering cooperation between the major actors as well as the continued 
political and economic empowerment of excluded communities. While the supply of finite 
natural resources decreases, the demand for natural resources keeps increasing as emerging 
economies continue to grow. States still believe extraction yields the economic growth essential 
to reducing poverty and providing social protection. Extractive industries still fail to move 
towards more renewable energy. Attempts at political and economic empowerment still results in 
punishment.  It is imperative in the present moment that each gram of gold mined yields the 
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